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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; insane offenders-release proceedings
Penal Code §§1026.2, 1026.5, 1611 (amended); §1603 (amended, re-
pealed and new).
AB 2944 (Bosco); STATS. 1982, Ch 1232
Support: Department of Finance; Department of Mental Health
AB 3388 (Goggin); STATS. 1982, Ch 650
(Effective August 27, 1982)
Support: Department of Finance; Department of Mental Health
Opposition: California Medical Association
SB 858 (Russel); STATS. 1982, Ch 930
Support: Department of Mental Health; Los Angeles County Dis-
trict Attorney
Existing law provides that a defendant who is found not guilty by
reason of insanity' will either be confined in a treatment facility2 or
placed on outpatient status, 3 unless it appears to the court that the de-
fendant's sanity has been fully restored.4 In addition, a defendant con-
fined to a treatment facility may be released upon (1) a determination
that sanity has been restored;5 (2) expiration of the maximum term of
commitment, unless the term has been extended;6 or (3) transfer to out-
patient status or a parole treatment program.7 Chapters 650, 930 and
1232 modify the procedures related to these release alternatives.,
Under existing law the determination that a confined person's sanity
has or has not been restored9 is made at a noticed hearing ° following
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (the defendant must be found to have been insane at the time
the offense was committed). See generally 4 CAL. CRIM. DEF. PRAc. (MB) §§86.01-86.04 (discus-
sion of insanity trial procedures).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026(a) (the facility will be either a state hospital for the men-
tally disordered or any other appropriate public or private facility approved by the county mental
health director).
3. See generallyid §§1600-14 (procedures pertaining to outpatient status for mentally disor-
dered and developmentally disabled offenders).
4. Id §1026(a).
5. See generally id §1026.2.
6. See generaly id §1026.5.
7. Id §1026.1. See generaly id §§1600-14.
8. See id §§1026.2, 1026.5, 1603, 1611.
9. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial §507 (Supp. 1978)
(discussion of standard for release).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.2 (provides for notice to the county mental health director and
the Director of Mental Health).
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an application I for the person's release.'2 Chapter 930 extends the no-
tice requirement to include notice to the prosecuting attorney. 13 In ad-
dition, Chapter 930 provides that if the release application is not made
by the medical director of the state hospital or treatment facility where
the person is committed, the court may not take any action on the ap-
plication without first obtaining the director's written
recommendation.' 4
Under existing law, a person committed to a treatment facility or
placed on outpatient status may not be kept in actual custody for longer
than the maximum term of commitment,' 5 unless a petition for ex-
tended commitment is granted.' 6 Under prior law, a prosecuting attor-
ney could file a petition for extended commitment only if the medical
director of a mental institution submitted a case file and supporting
evaluations to the prosecuting attorney indicating that the offender
presented a substantial danger of physical harm to others.' 7 This effec-
tively left the decision of whether or not to petition up to the various
medical directors.'" In apparent response to concern over the consis-
tency with which these petitions have been filed, 1 Chapter 650 re-
quires medical directors to submit their opinions20 to prosecuting
attorneys no later than 180 days prior to the expiration of the maxi-
mum term of commitment.2' If requested by the prosecuting attorney,
the opinions must be accompanied by supporting evaluations and rele-
vant hospital records. 22
Under existing law, a person acquitted of the commission of a speci-
11. See id (the application may be by the confined person, or by the medical director of the
treatment facility, or by the county mental health director when the person is on outpatient status),
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id §1026.5(a) (defines the maximum term of commitment). Seegenerall, In re Moye, 22
Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978) (the court held the institutional confinement
may not exceed the maximum term for the underlying offense); 4 CAL. Cram. DEF. PRAc. (MB)
§86.10[6] (discussing duration of commitment under these provisions).
16. See id §1026.5(b)(1) (persons who may be subject to extended commitment must have
been charged with the commission of a specified felony offense). The specified offenses are mur-
der, mayhem; kidnapping with intentional infliction of great bodily injury; first degree robbery or
robbery when the victim suffers great bodily injury; arson; first degree burglary; assault with intent
to commit murder, aggravated assault with intent to commit murder; aggravated assault; possess-
ing or exploding destructive devices; or committing a felony involving death, great bodily injury
or a serious threat of bodily harm. Id See generally Comment, Outpatlent Status.: Beyond the
Term of Commitment, 13 PAC. L.J. 1189 (1982); 11 PAC. L.J., REVEW OF SELECTED 1979 CALI-
FORNIA LEGISLATION 445 (1980).
17. CAL. STATS. 1980, C. 1117, §6.1, at 3592 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5).
18. See id
19. See CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 650, §3, at -.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(b)(2). The opinion concerns whether or not the disordered
person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. Id §1026.5(b)(1).
21. Id §1026.5(b)(2).
22. Id
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fled felony 3 by reason of insanity may not be considered for release to
outpatient status until that person has been confined in a treatment fa-
cility for at least 90 days.2 4 This release to outpatient status is predi-
cated upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.2 5 Chapter 1232
provides that these conditions include notice to the victim or next of
kin of the victim of the offense for which the person was committed, if a
request for notice has been filed with the court.26 In addition, the di-
rector of the mental institution where the person is confined must no-
tify the victim or next of kin of the victim at the start of any program in
which the committed person is to be allowed any type of day release
that is unattended by the staff of the facility. 7
Existing conditions under which a person may be placed on a parole
treatment program23 are comparable to those relating to outpatient sta-
tus.2 9 Similarly, a request for revocation of parole status or outpatient
treatment may be submitted if the subject person appears to require
extended inpatient treatment or refuses to accept supervision. 30 Pend-
ing the revocation hearing, a person on outpatient status may be con-
fined in a treatment facility if, in the opinion of the county mental
health director, a delay in hospitalization would pose an imminent risk
of harm to the person or another.31 Chapter 930 enacts a similar provi-
sion that authorizes a parole supervisor to request a peace officer to
cause an imminently dangerous person to be transferred to a treatment
facility, pending the revocation hearing.32 A person hospitalized under
this provision is entitled to judicial review and an explanation of
rights. 3
23. Compare id §1026.5 with id §1601(a) (both sections specify the same offenses). See note
16 supra.
24. See id §1026.2. See generally 12 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1980 CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATION 360 (1981).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1603. The specified conditions are as follows: (1) the director of
the treatment facility must advise the court that the defendant is no longer likely to be a danger to
others and will benefit from outpatient status; (2) the county mental health director must advise
the court that the defendant will benefit from outpatient status and must identify an appropriate
program of supervision and treatment; (3) after specified notice and a hearing, the court must
specifically approve the recommendation and plan for outpatient status. Id.
26. Id §1603(c).
27. Id
28. See generally id §1611 (a court may order parole treatment if a county does not have an
appropriate outpatient status program, or if the county refuses to assume treatment responsibility).
29. Compare id §1611(a) with id §§1602, 1603.
30. See id §§1608, 1609, 1611(b).
31. Id §1610.
32. Seeid §161 l(c)(1) (the parole supervisor must notify the court in writing of the person's
admission as well as the factual basis for the opinion that an immediate return to inpatient treat-
ment was necessary).
33. Id §1611(c)(2).
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In summary, Chapters 650, 930 and 1232 further safeguard society
against the premature release of dangerously insane persons by provid-
ing for (1) increased prosecutor participation in release and extended
commitment proceedings,34 (2) victim notification, 35 and (3) confine-
ment pending the parole revocation determination.36
34. Seeid §§1026.2, 1026.5.
35. Id §1603.
36. Id §1611.
Criminal Procedure; weapons-search and seizure, crimes and
penalties, probation, disposal, kidnapping
Penal Code §§417.1, 417.6, 417.8, 833.5, 1203.095, 12001.6, 12021.1
(new); §§207, 245, 246, 417, 12021, 12022, 12022.5, 12025, 12028,
12031 (amended).
AB 614 (Statham); STATS. 1982, Ch 167
Support: California Highway Patrol; Department of Corrections;
Lassen County Peace Officers Association
AB 846 (Levine); STATS. 1982, Ch 136
(Effective March 26, 1982)
Support: Attorney General; California Peace Officers Association;
Department of Finance
AB 3314 (Levine); STATS. 1982, Ch 1404
Support: California Peace Officers Association; Department of Cor-
rections; Department of Finance
SB 561 (Davis); STATS. 1982, Ch 142
Support: Attorney General; California District Attorneys' Associa-
tion; Peace Officers Research Association of California
Opposition: Department of Corrections; Department of Finance
In an apparent effort to deter the increasing use of firearms and to
protect peace officers and firefighters from this increasing use, the Leg-
islature has enacted Chapters 136, 142, 167 and 1404.1 To accomplish
this goal, Chapter 142 apparently follows the holding of In re Tony C. 2
by authorizing peace officers to detain and search individuals suspected
of possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon.3 Chapters 136 and 142
1. See CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 136, §14, at -- ; Telephone conversation with Jim Rushford,
Legislative Aide to Senator Davis, June 22, 1982 (notes on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
2. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
3. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §833.5 with In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 893, 582 P.2d 957,
959, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1978).
Pacific Law Journal Vol 14
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create separate punishment classifications for the illegal use and posses-
sion of firearms.4 Additionally, under Chapter 136, it is now unlawful
for any person previously convicted of any offense that constitutes the
violent use of a firearm' to possess or control a concealable firearm.6
Chapter 136 imposes minimum sentences for persons convicted of
firearm violations,' and, except in unusual circumstances,8 conditions a
grant of probation or suspension on a specified period of mandatory
imprisonment being served.9 Moreover, Chapter 142 requires that fire-
arms' ° or deadly weapons11 used in violation of specified provisions'
2
are now to be disposed of under appropriate procedures. 13 Addition-
ally, in an unrelated change Chaper 1404 apparently follows the hold-
ing in People v. Oliver'4 by allowing the taking of a minor
unaccompanied by force for the purpose of sexual molestation to be
prosecuted as kidnapping.' 5
Detention
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio6 stated that a
suspect could be seized and frisked for weapons if a police officer had a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring and the of-
ficer had a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed and danger-
ous.' 7 In In re Tony C., the California Supreme Court held that to
justify the stop or detention the officer must entertain specific and ar-
ticulable facts that a crime has or will take place and that the individual
is involved in the criminal activity. 1
Chapter 142 apparently follows this case law by statutorily permit-
ting a peace officer to detain and search a person if the officer has rea-
4. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §245 and CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 136, §1, at - (amending CAL.
PENAL CODE §245) with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1340, § 3.2, at 4719 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE
§245); Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 417 with CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 667, §1, at 2184 (amending
CAL. PENAL CODE §4!7).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §12021.1(b) (definition of violent offense).
6. Id §12021.I(a).
7. Id §§246, 417, 1203.095, 12021.1, 12025.
8. Id §§1203.095(b), 12021.1(d), 12025(e), 12031(a).
9. Id §§1203.095(a), 12021.1(a), (c), 12025(a), (b), (d), 12031(a).
10. Id §12001 (definition of firearm).
11. People v. Mortenson, 210 Cal. App. 2d 575, 582, 26 Cal. Rptr. 746, 750 (1962) (definition
of deadly weapon).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE §§245(d), 417.6(b), 833.5(a), 12022(b), 12022.5.
13. Id §12028.
14. See 55 Cal. 2d 761, 768, 361 P.2d 593, 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (1961).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE §207(b).
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. 392 U.S. at 27.
18. 21 Cal. 3d at 893, 582 P.2d at 959, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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sonable cause 9 to believe that a violation pertaining to firearms or
deadly weapons has occurred.20 If the officer reasonably concludes the
person detained may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct
a limited search2" of the suspect for firearms or weapons.22 The officer,
however, cannot search the person at the person's residence or place of
business unless there is a search warrant or other grounds giving rea-
sonable cause.23
Crimes & Penalties
A. Assault with Firearms
Under prior law, a person who committed an assault 24 with a deadly
weapon or instrument 25 or by any means of force2 6 likely to produce
great bodily injury 27 was punished by either a state prison term of two,
three, or four years, or a county jail term of not more than one year, a
fine ranging up to $5,000, or both fine and imprisonment.28 Chapter
142 retains these penalties for assault with a deadly weapon other than
a firearm but creates a mandatory jail term for any person who com-
mits an assault with a firearm.29 A person who assaults another person
with'a firearm is subject to either a state prison term of two, three, or
four years or a county jail term ranging between six months to oneyear,
a fine ranging up to $5,000, or both a fine and imprisonment.30
Prior law provided that if a person committed an assault with a
deadly weapon or instrument upon a peace officer 3' or firefighter -32 and
knew or should reasonably have known that the officer or firefighter
was performing official duties, the assaulting person was to be sen-
19. CAL. PENAL CODE §833.5(a) (reasonable cause to detain requires there to be specific and
articulable facts available to warrant detention).
20. Id §833.5(a).
21. See generally People v. Juarez, 35 Cal. App. 3d 631, 110 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1973) (discussion
of the extent of a limited search).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE §833.5(b).
23. Id §833.5(d).
24. Id §240 (definition of assault).
25. See generally People v. Claborn, 224 Cal. App. 2d 38, 36 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1964) (deter-
mines when an instrument is capable of being a deadly weapon).
26. See generally People v. Mueller, 147 Cal. App. 2d 233, 305 P.2d 178 (1956) (the Vravamen
of the crime defined by Penal Code Section 245 is the likelihood that the force applied or at-
tempted to be applied will result in great bodily injury).
27. People v. Lira, 119 Cal. App. 3d 837, 860, 174 Cal. Rptr. 207, 218 (1981) (definition of
great bodily injury).
28. CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1340, §3.2, at 4719 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §245).
29. Id §245(a)(2). Chapter 136 enacted identical language that took effect March 26, 1982.
CAL. STATs. 1982, c. 136, §1, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §245).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE §245(a)(2).
31. Id §245(e) (persons designated as peace officers).
32. Id §245.1 (definition of fireman).
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tenced to a state prison for a term of three, four, or five years.33 Chap-
ter 142 retains these penalties for assaulting a peace officer or firefighter
with a deadly weapon other than a firearm but creates a more severe
punishment if the assault is committed with a firearm.34 The use of a
firearm by a person assaulting a peace officer or firefighter will subject
the person to a state prison sentence of either four, six, or eight years.3
Finally, Chapter 1404 provides that an additional state prison term of
two years may be imposed on a person convicted of assault with a fire-
arm, even though the use of the firearm was an element of the offense.
3 6
B. Exhibition of Firearms
Prior law made the unlawful use of a firearm or deadly weapon in a
fight or quarrel, or the drawing or exhibiting of the weapon in a rude or
37 38 nr 39threatening manner, except in self-defense, a misdemeanor.
Chapter 136 retains the misdemeanor classification, but distinguishes
between the illegal use of a weapon and a firearm.4' The illegal use of
a weapon, other than a firearm, against an individual is still a misde-
meanor.4' If a firearm is drawn or exhibited in a rude or threatening
manner, however, Chapter 136 requires that the person serve a
mandatory county jail term of between three and six months, and the
person may, in addition, be fined up to $500.42
Under existing law, the drawing or exhibiting of a firearm in a rude
or angry manner against a peace officer by a person who knows or
should know the officer is performing official duties is a felony punish-
able by a jail term not to exceed one year.43 Chapter 136 establishes a
minimum six month sentence for this offense.' In addition, Chapter
142 provides that any person who draws or exhibits a firearm or deadly
weapon with the intent to resist or prevent the arrest of any person by a
peace officer is subject to a state prison term of two, three, or four
years.45
33. CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1340, §3.2, at 4719.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE §245(c).
35. Id
36. Id §12022.5.
37. See generally People v. Mercer, 113 Cal. App. 3d 803, 169 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1980) (example
of exhibiting a weapon in a rude and threatening manner).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE §693 (definition of self-defense).
39. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 667, §1, at 2184 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §417).
40. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §417 with CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 667, §1, at 2184.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE §417(a)(1).
42. Id §417(a)(2).
43. Id §417(b).
44. Id
45. Id §417.8.
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Prior to the enactment of Chapter 167 there was no specific prohibi-
tion against the drawing or exhibiting of a firearm in a rude or threat-
ening manner in the presence of a reserve or auxiliary peace officer.n6
Chapter 167 now makes the drawing or exhibiting of a firearm in the
presence of a reserve or auxiliary sheriff, city police officer, or deputy
sheriff a felony. 7 The punishment for this offense is imprisonment not
to exceed one year. 8 Chapter 142 increases the possible punishment if
serious bodily injury49 is intentionally inflicted by the person exhibiting
or drawing a firearm or deadly weapon when committing these speci-
fied offenses." The person will be sentenced to a term not to exceed
one year in the county jail or imprisonment in the state prison.5'
C Minimum Sentences & Probation
Chapter 136 specifies minimum sentences of either three or six
months for certain offenses involving firearms,52 and conditions any
grant of probation or suspension of sentence upon serving a minimum
prison term. 3 The only exception to serving a minimum sentence
under the provisions of Chapter 136 is if the court determines in unu-
sual cases that the interests of justice would be better served by forego-
ing the minimum imprisonment requirement.5
A minimum sentence of six months imprisonment is now mandatory
for any person convicted of a malicious55 and willfull5 6 discharge of a
firearm at an inhabited57 dwelling house, occupied building, occupied
motor vehicle, or inhabited housecar or camper5 - Additionally, a per-
son who has been convicted of (1) assault on another person or a peace
officer or firefighter with a firearm,59 (2) discharging intentionally a
firearm at inhabited dwellings or vehicles, 60 or (3) drawing or exhibit-
ing a firearm in a rude or threatening manner in the presence of a peace
46. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §417.1 with id §417.
47. Id §417.1.
48. Id
49. Id §417.6(a). Chapter 142 defines serious bodily injury as serious impairment of physi-
cal condition. Id
50. Id §417.6(a); see id §§417, 417.1, 417.8.
51. Id §417.6(a).
52. Id §§246, 417, 12021.1, 12025(d), 12031(a).
53. Id §§1203.095(a), 12021.1(a), (c), 12025(a), (b), (d), 12031(a). Seegeneral yid §1203.1
(judge may make serving a prison term a condition of probation).
54. Id §§1203.095(b), 12021.1(d), 12025(e), 12031(a).
55. Id §7(4) (definition of maliciously).
56. Id §7(l) (definition of willfully).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE §246 (definition of inhabited).
58. Id §246.
59. Id §245(a)(2), (c).
60. Id §246.
Pacdfc Law Journal Vol. 14
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officer 61 must now serve a minimum six month county jail sentence as a
condition for a grant of probation or suspension of sentence, 62 unless in
the discretion of the court, the interests of justice would be better
served by granting the probation.
63
Chapter 136 creates a minimum six month sentence for any person
who has been convicted of a specified violent offense 6 and who also
owns or possesses a concealable 65 firearm.6 6 A grant of probation or
suspension of sentence upon conviction of this offense is conditioned
upon serving six months in jail.67 This mandatory jail term also applies
to a juvenile convicted of the offense if prosecuted as an adult.68 If the
court determines the interests of justice would be better served, proba-
tion without a jail term may be granted.69
Additionally, Chapter 136 requires that a minimum three month
county jail sentence be imposed as a condition7° for granting probation
or suspending a sentence when any of the following crimes have been
committed: (1) when a person has been convicted of a felony and is
later convicted for the unauthorized carrying of a weapon,7' (2) when a
person is convicted of a specified misdemeanor offense72 and is later
convicted of the unauthorized carrying of a weapon, 73 (3) when a per-
61. Id §417(b).
62. Id §1203.095(a).
63. Id §1203.095(b).
64. Id §12021.1(b) (the specified offenses are murder or voluntary manslaughter; mayhem;
rape; sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; oral copulation by
force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; lewd acts on a child under the age
of fourteen years; any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; any
other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an
accomplice, which haE been charged and proven, or any felony in which the defendant uses a
firearm which use has been charged and proven; attempted murder;, assault with intent to commit
rape or robbery; assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer;, assault by a life
prisoner on a non-inmate; assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; arson; exploding a destruc-
tive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury; exploding a destructive device or any
explosive with intent to murder, robbery; kidnapping; taking a hostage by an inmate of a state
prison; attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life; any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; escape
from a state prison by use of force or violence; assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to
produce great bodily injury; any attempt to commit a crime listed above other than an assault; any
offense designated as a violent use of a firearm).
65. Id §12001 (definition of concealable weapon).
66. Id §12021(a), (b).
67. CAL. PENAL CODE §12021.1(a).
68. Id §12021.1(c).
69. Id §12021.1(d).
70. See Exparle Hays, 120 Cal. App. 2d 308, 310, 260 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1953) (condition
imposed as part of probation that first eight months of probationary period be served in county
jail is valid).
71. Id §12025(a), (b).
72. Id §12001.6 (the misdemeanor offenses are assault upon a person with a firearm or two
or more violations for drawing or exhibiting a firearm in a rude or threatening manner or the
illegal use of a firearm in a fight or quarrel).
73. Id §12025(a), (b), (d).
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son who has been convicted of the violent use of a firearm74 and is later
convicted of carrying either upon the person or in a vehicle, a loaded
firearm in specified public places,75 or (4) when a person is convicted of
drawing or exhibiting a firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner
against another person.76 This imposition of minimum sentences may
be waived in unusual cases when the court determines that probation
should be granted in the interests of justice.77
Disposal of Weapons
Existing law outlines specified procedures for the disposition or de-
struction of firearms and weapons.78 Under prior law, weapons could
be deemed nuisances79 and disposed of only if the defendant was con-
victed.8" Chapter 142 provides that for purposes of declaring the
weapon a nuisance, a finding that the defendant committed the offense
but was insane at the time will suffice as a conviction with regard to
disposition of the weapon.8' Additionally, Chapter 142 requires that
any weapon or firearm owned by the defendant and used in violation
of specified provisions8 2 be declared a nuisance and be either dis-
posed83 of or destroyed by the police or sherifis department.84
Kidnapping
Existing kidnapping law provides that a person who forcibly steals,
takes, or arrests another person and carries that person into another
country, state, county, or another part of the same county, is guilty of
kidnapping. 5 In People v. Oliver, 6 the California Supreme Court held
that a kidnapping occurred when a person, who by reason of immatur-
ity or mental condition was incapable of giving legal consent, was
taken without the use of force for an illegal purpose or intent.8 Chap-
ter 1404 partially follows this holding by providing that a person, who
for the purpose of commiting a lewd or lascivious act upon the body of
a child under the age of 14, hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces
74. Id §12031(a), 12001.6.
75. Id §12031(a).
76. Id §417(a)(2).
77. Id §§1203.095(b), 12025(e), 12031(a).
78. Id §12028.
79. Id §370 (definition of nuisance).
80. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1057, §1, at 1887 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §12028).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE §12028(b).
82. Id §§245(d), 417.6(b), 833.5(e), 12022, 12022.5.
83. Id §12028(c).
84. Id
85. CAL. PENAL CODE §207.
86. 55 Cal. 2d 761, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865, 361 P.2d 593 (1961).
87. Id. at 768, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 869, 361 P.2d at 597.
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by false promises or misrepresentations any child under the age of 14 to
leave this country, state, county, or go to another part of the same
county is guilty of kidnapping. 88
Conclusion
The enactment of Chapters 136, 142, and 167 reflects the concern of
the Legislature over the increasing use of firearms against the public in
general and peace officers and firefighters in particular.8 9 In an effort to
deter the use of firearms, Chapters 136 and 142 create separate punish-
ment classifications for the illegal use of firearms. 90 Additionally,
Chapter 136 requires that a minimum sentence be imposed for firearm
violations in order to receive a grant of probation or suspension of sen-
tence.9 Chapter 142 also requires the disposal of weapons illegally
used92 and authorizes peace officers to detain and search those individ-
uals believed to have committed a violation of a law relating to fire-
arms.93  Finally, Chapter 1404 allows the taking of a minor
unaccompanied by force for the purpose of sexual molestation to be
prosecuted as a kidnapping.94
88. CAL. PENAL CODE §207(b).
89. See CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 136, §14, at -- ; Telephone conversation with Jim Rushford,
Legislative Aide to Senator Davis, June 22, 1982 (notes on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE §§245, 417.
91. Id §§246, 417, 1203.095, 12021.1, 12025.
92. Id §12028.
93. Id §833.5.
94. Id §207(b).
Criminal Procedure; mental capacity for specific intent
Penal Code §§21, 22, 28, 188 (amended).
SB 2035 (Roberti); STATS. 1982, Ch 1017
Support: Attorney General; California District Attorneys' Associa-
tion; Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code
Opposition: State Public Defender
In 1981, legislation was enacted eliminating the defense of dimin-
ished capacity' and prohibiting evidence of mental disease2 or volun-
1. See People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 319, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820
(1966); People v. Spaniel, 262 Cal. App. 2d 878, 886, 69 Cal. Rptr. 202, 207 (1968); CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL CALJIC 8.79 (4th ed. 1979) (definition of diminished capacity).
2. See In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 427-28, 584 P.2d 524, 530, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387, 393
(1978) (definition of mental disease).
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tary intoxication3 to show that the person accused of the crime did not
have the ability to form the mental state necessary to commit that
crime.4 The legislation did, however, allow evidence of mental disease
or voluntary intoxication to be used to show that the accused did not in
fact form the required mental state for either general or specific intent
crimes.5
In an apparent attempt to clarify this legislation,6 Chapter 1017 lim-
its the use of evidence of voluntary intoxication, mental disease, mental
defect,7 or mental disorder' by permitting the evidence to be admissible
only to determine if the defendant formed the specific intent, premedi-
tation, deliberation, or malice aforethought required for a specific in-
tent crime.9 Chapter 1017 does not limit the authority of a court to
admit or exclude, pursuant to the rules of evidence, evidence of a
mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder of the defendant at
the time of the alleged crime.1"
Existing law provides that there will be no diminished capacity, di-
minished responsibility, or irresistible impulse defense allowed in crim-
inal actions." Chapter 1017 specifies that these defenses will also not
be allowed in juvenile adjudication hearings.12 Chapter 1017, however,
provides that this provision is not applicable to persons not considered
legally capable of committing a crime.' 3
Chapter 1017 revises the definition of malice necessary for the crime
of murder. 4 Existing law states that an awareness of the obligation to
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §22(c) (definition of voluntary intoxication).
4. See CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 404, §2, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §22), CAL. STATS.
1981, c. 404, §4, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §28). See generally 13 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF
SELECTED 1981 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 651 (1982).
5. See CAL. STATS. 1981, C. 404, §§2, 4, at -.
6. See Telephone conversation with Ned Cohen, Consultant to the Joint Committee on Re-
vision of the California Penal Code (September 9, 1982) (notes on file at the Pacic Law Journal).
7. 22 Cal. 3d at 427-28, 584 P.2d at 530, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (definition of mental defect).
8. See id (definition of mental disorder).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §§22, 28. The restriction of the use of this evidence is necessary to
correct an oversight that occurred in last year's legislation since the California Supreme Court has
only allowed a diminished capacity defense to be used for crimes requiring specific intent. See
People v. Foster, 19 Cal. App. 3d 649, 654, 97 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1971); Telephone conversation,
note 6 su.pra.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §28(d).
11. Id §28(b).
12. Id
13. Id §§21(b), 26 (persons considered incapable of committing crimes include children
under the age of 14 in the absence of clear proof to the contrary; idiots; persons laboring under a
mistake of fact that negates criminal intent; persons who are unconscious at the time of the com-
mission of the allegedly criminal act; persons who commit the allegedly criminal act through
misfortune or accident; and persons who are forced to commit a non-capital crime).
14. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §188 with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 404, §6, at -- ; CAL. PENAL
CODE §188 with id §7(4) (different statutory definitions of malice). See generally People v. Way-
man, 1 Cal. App. 246, 248, 81 P. 1087 (1905) (the court states that the definition of malice in
section 7(4) of the Penal Code is not of the type of malice necessary for the crime of murder),
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act within the ordinary laws of society is not necessary for the element
of malice.1 5 Chapter 1017 provides that acting despite an awareness of
the obligation to act within the general laws regulating society is in-
cluded in the definition of malice. 6 Finally, the amendments made by
Chapter 1017, excluding the provisions pertaining to the admission of
evidence of mental disease, defect or disorder, are specified as declara-
tory of existing law."
15. CAL. PENAL CODE §188; see People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 924, 49
Cal. Rptr. 815, 828 (1966). The court required that "an awareness of the obligation to act within
the general body of laws regulating society" exist within the person accused of murder before a
finding of implied malice could be made from the circumstance of their act. Id
16. CAL. PENAL CODE §188.
17. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 1017, §5, at -. Proposition 8 purports to eliminate the defense of
diminished capacity. To ensure that there will be no conflict between the two pieces of legislation,
the Attorney General's office cooperated with Senator Roberti to write Chapter 1017 to comple-
ment Proposition 8. See Office of the Attorney General, California Department of Justice, Guide
to Proposition 8, at 8-1 to 8-8 (June 1982) (copy on file at the Pacpfc Law Journal); Telephone
conversation with Allen Arronberg, Legislative Unit, Attorney General's Office (September 20,
1982) (notes on fie at the Pacfc Law Journal).
Criminal Procedure; mental incompetency determination
hearing
Penal Code §1368.1 (amended).
AB 3721 (Farr); STATS. 1982, Ch 444
Support: California Hospital Association; Pleasant Valley Hospital
District; Office of Planning and Research
Existing law will not permit a defendant who is found mentally in-
competent' to be tried in a court of law.2 Existing law provides that if,
during the pendency of an action and prior to final judgment, the de-
fendant's mental capacity is at issue, the defense attorney may request a
hearing or the court may, on its own motion, require a hearing to deter-
mine the defendant's mental state. The hearing will, unless otherwise
specified, suspend all other proceedings in the criminal prosecution.
I. CAL. PENAL CODE §1367 (definition of mental incompetence); see People v. Campbell, 63
Cal. App. 3d 599, 608, 133 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976); 1 B. WITIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, Trial §509 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as WrrgiN].
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §1367; see WrrKN, supra note 1, §508(a). "The conviction of an ac-
cused person while he is legally incompetent is a violation of due process .... Pate v. Robin-
son, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §§1368(a), (b); WrrgiN, supra note 1, §510(a). See CONTINUING EDU-
CATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTIlCE §17.26 (Supp. 1980).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §1368(c).
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Prior to the enactment of Chapter 444, the information or indictment
charging a felony had to be fied before the hearing to determine the
defendant's mental competence. 5 This was a legislative attempt to cure
previous provisions6 that permitted the defendant to be committed
without a determination that the defendant committed the charged
crime simply because the defendant was incompetent to proceed to
trial.
7
Chapter 444, in an apparent attempt to avoid the duplicity of court
hearings,' declares that if the action is on a complaint charging the
felony, the proceedings to determine mental competence will be held
prior to the filing of the information unless the defense counsel requests
a preliminary hearing.9 Under this statutory scheme, the court will
avoid the previous procedure of two mandatory court hearings when
the defendant's mental state has been put into issue since a determina-
tion that the defendant is mentally incompetent to be tried will relieve
the court of the burden of a second hearing.' 0
Additionally, existing law provides that in an action on a complaint 1
charging a misdemeanor the defense attorney may (1) demur, (2) move
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is not reasonable
cause to believe that a public offense has been committed and that the
defendant is guilty of that offense, or (3) make a motion to suppress
evidence.' 2 Chapter 444, to ensure that the person charged with the
felony is afforded the opportunity to challenge the charges before the
competency hearing, now allows the defendant's counsel, in a case
when the complaint is charging a felony, to request a preliminary hear-
ing to determine the sufficiency of the complaint.13 At this preliminary
hearing, defendant's counsel may (1) demur, (2) move to dismiss on the
ground there is not reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been
5. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1511, §4, at 3317 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §1368.1).
6. Id
7. WrrKIN, supra note 1, §510; see Hale v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 221, 229, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 57, 62, 539 P.2d 817, 822 (1975). See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); In re
Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1973) (holding incompetency commitment
proc-dures denied a defendant due process and equal protection of the laws); Chambers v. Munic-
ipal Court, 43 Cal. App. 3d 809, 118 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1974) (holding CAL. PENAL CODE §1368.1
constitutional); Parker, Calornia's New Scheme/or the Commitment of Individuals Found Incom-
petent to Stand Trial, 6 PAC. L.J. 484 (1975).
8. See Telephone conversation with Richard Iglehart, Deputy District Attorney for Ala-
meda County, (August 9, 1982) (notes on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §1368.1(a).
10. Id; see Telephone conversation, supra note 8.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §806 (definition of complaint).
12. Id §§1368.1(b), 1538.5 (motion to suppress evidence). See WITIN, supra note 1, §510: 6
PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 273 (1975).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §1368.1(a).
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committed and the defendant is guilty of that offense, 4 or (3) make a
motion to suppress evidence.' 5
Prior law had mandated that in a misdemeanor complaint originat-
ing in a municipal or justice court, the court having jurisdiction over
the complaint would hear any of these pretrial motions. 6 Chapter 444
now provides that in a case in which a complaint charges either a mis-
demeanor or a felony, the motions will be heard in the court having
jurisdiction over the complaint.'7
14. Id §995.
15. Id §§1368.1(a), 1538.5 (motion to suppress evidence).
16. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1511, §4, at 3317 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §1368.1).
17. Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §1368.1(d). Existing law also provides that the court,
when ruling on any motion in California Penal Code sections 1368.1(a) or (b), may hear any other
matter capable of fair determination without personal participation of the defendant. Id
§1368.1(c). California Penal Code section 1368.1(d) also provides that the defendant will not be
certified to the superior court for a mental incompetency hearing until all allowable motions have
been heard. Id §1368.1(d).
Criminal Procedure; requirement for public preliminary
examination-exceptions
Government Code §6254 (amended); Penal Code §868.7 (new);
§§867, 868 (amended).
AB 277 (Goggin); STATS. 1982, Ch 83
(Effective March 1, 1982)
Support: California Peace Officers Association
Opposition: City of Los Angeles; City of Oakland
Chapter 83 makes major changes in the procedures to be followed at
preliminary examinations' and in the type of information to be dis-
closed under the California Public Records Act (hereinafter referred to
as CPRA),u in order to alleviate confusion concerning public access to
both criminal proceedings and nonsensitive law enforcement records.
Chapter 83 also mandates the exclusion of unexamined witnesses from
a preliminary hearing if either party should so desire.4 Furthermore,
Chapter 83 orders previously exempted information to be disclosed
1. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§867, 868, and 868.7 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1178, §§1, 2
at 5274 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§867, 868).
2. CAL. Gov'T. CODE §6251. Compare CAL. Gov'T. CODE §6254(f) with CAL. STATS. 1981,
c. 684, §1.5, at 420 (amending CAL. GOV'T. CODE §6254). Additionally, Chapter 1594, effective
September 30, 1982, exempts the records of the Medi-Cal special negotiator from disclosure. CAL.
STATS. 1982, c. 1594, §2, at -.
3. See CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 83, §6, at -.
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §867.
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under the CPRA5 and permits closing a preliminary examination to the
press and public under additional conditions.'
Access to Public Records
Existing law provides that investigative and security records are ex-
pressly exempt from the right of every citizen to inspect public records.
7
Chapter 83 further exempts from disclosure information held by state
and law enforcement agencies regarding the circumstances surrounding
an arrest or complaint. Chapter 83 specifically states, however, that
this exemption will not apply to certain information concerning both
the accused9 and the victim'0 unless the release of information would
endanger either the safety of persons involved in the investigation or
jeopardize the successful completion of the investigation itself."I Fur-
thermore, Chapter 83 states that nondisclosure of a person's address is
permissible when the person was a victim of a sex crime or child or
spousal abuse.' 2 Chapter 83 provides these safeguards in addition to
already existing protections in the CPRA13 in apparent response to the
concern expressed in case law that victims may be reluctant to report
crimes if public disclosure is allowed.'
4
Exclusion of Witnesses
Existing law provides for motions to exclude witnesses from the
courtroom' 5 and to clear the courtroom entirely.' 6 Under prior law,
the magistrate 17 possessed discretionary authority to exclude wit-
nesses.' 8 Confusion often arose when an ambiguous motion was
5. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE §6254(f) with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 684, §1.5, at 420.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§868, 868.7.
7. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §6254(f); see id §6253.
8. Compare id §6254(f)(1), (2) with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 684, §1.5, at 420.
9. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE §6254(f)(1). This information includes the full name, current
address, occupation, and date of birth of the individual arrested; the individual's physical descrip-
tion, the circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of
release or where the individual is being held, and all charges upon which the individual is being
held. Id
10. See id §6254(f)(2). This information includes the name, age, and address of the victim,
and the circumstances of the crime or incident including a description of any injuries, property, or
weapons involved. Id
11. See id §6254(f).
12. Id §6254(f)(2).
13. See id §6255. If the public interest served by nondisclosure clearly outweighs the inter-
ests served by disclosure, nondisclosure is permissible. Id
14. See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 649, 653, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110-11
(1974).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE §867.
16. Id §868.
17. Id. §§807 (definition of magistrate), 808 (persons designated as magistrates).
18. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1178, §1, at 5274 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §867).
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made. 9 Chapter 83 relieves this problem by requiring that all witnesses
be excluded from the hearing on a motion from either party.20 More-
over, Chapter 83 attempts to preserve the integrity of testimony taken
in a preliminary examination by requiring the magistrate to prevent the
witnesses from conversing with one another.2 '
Closing of Preliminary Examinations
Chapter 83 states that preliminary examinations are to be open and
public. 22  If, however, the defendant requests that the courtroom be
cleared and the magistrate finds that exclusion is necessary to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial, the magistrate must exclude every-
one from the courtroom except those specified.2 3
Chapter 83 further adds that the hearing may be closed on the prose-
cutor's motion during a witness' testimony if the witness is a minor and
a victim of a sex offense 24 or if the witness' life is jeopardized by public
testimony.25 This closing, however, may occur only if no alternative
procedures26 are available to protect the witness.' If the hearing is
ordered closed, a transcript of the hearing is to be made public as soon
as practicable.28
Comment
Several important issues are raised by the enactment of Chapter 83.
Specifically, the extent of the right of a defendant to a public hearing is
called into question.
Chapter 83 provides that the preliminary hearing may be closed in
19. See generally People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963);
People v. Bookout, 197 Cal. App. 2d 457, 17 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1961); People v. Malloy, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 219, 18 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1962); People v. Gentemann, 201 Cal. App. 2d 711, 20 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1962) (all cases discuss whether a motion made was to exclude only witnesses and therefore
discretionary, or to clear the courtroom entirely and thus mandatory).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE §867.
21. See id
22. See id. §868.
23. Id The following will not be excluded from a preliminary examination: the magistrate's
clerk, the court reporter, the bailiff, the prosecutor, the prosecutor's counsel, the Attorney General,
the county district attorney, the investigating officer, the officer in custody of a prisoner witness
while the prisoner testifies, the defendant, the defendant's counsel, the officer having custody of
the defendant, and a support person chosen by the prosecuting witness. Id
24. See id §868.7(a)(1).
25. See Id §868.7(a)(2).
26. See id §868.7. Alternative procedures include, but are not limited to, videotaped deposi-
tions, closed circuit examinations, concealment of physical features, searching the public, and the
temporary exclusion of witnesses. Id See generally 14 PAC. L.J., REViEW OF SELECTED CALIFOR-
NIA 1982 LEGISLATION (1983).
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE §868.7(a)(1), (2).
28. See id §868.7(b).
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specified circumstances on the motion of the prosecutor.29 In Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,3" the United States Supreme Court
rejected as unconstitutional a Massachusetts law requiring a closed trial
where the victim of a sex crime was under eighteen.31 Since the Cali-
fornia provision is discretionary 32 and relates to preliminary examina-
tions rather than to the trial itself,33 the constitutional issues presented
in Globe do not appear to arise.
Another possible constitutional issue still remains, however, in light
of the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Pompa-Oriz.34
In that case the court found that defendants have a right to a public
preliminary hearing,35 with the majority finding a basis in legislative
intent,36 and Chief Justice Bird finding an unspecified constitutional
right in her concurring opinion. 7 While Chapter 83 clarifies legislative
intent by permitting closure of a preliminary hearing in specified cir-
cumstances, 38 the question of whether the constitutional right to an
open trial also attaches to the preliminary hearing is still unanswered.39
29. See id §868.7. The hearing may be closed if the witness is a minor, the victim of a sex
offense and serious psychological harm would be threatened by testifying in public, or if a wit-
ness life would be subject to substantial risk by appearing in public. Id
30. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
31. See id at 2622.
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE §868.7(a)..
33. See id
34. 27 Cal. 3d 519, 612 P.2d 941, 165 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1980).
35. See id at 526, 612 P.2d at 945, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
36. See id at 524-26, 612 P.2d at 943-45, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 853-55.
37. See id at 531, 612 P.2d at 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE §868.7(a).
39. See Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394-5 (Burger, C.J., concurring), 434, 437
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1979); San Jose Mercury-News v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510-11, 638 P.2d 655, 662-63, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 779-80 (1982);
Borow and Kurth, ClosedPreliinary Hearings: The Constitutionality ofPenal Code Section 868 in
the Aftermath ofGannett v. DePasquale, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 18,20 (1980); Geis, Preliminary Hearings
and the Press, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 397, 412-13 (1961) (comparison of preliminary examinations
and suppression hearings with trials).
Criminal Procedure; arraignments
Penal Code §976 (amended).
AB 2768 (Robinson); STATS. 1982, Ch 395
Support: Judicial Council; Orange County
Opposition: Orange County Chiefs of Police and Sheriffs
Association
Under existing law, unless an exception applies, a defendant must be
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arraigned' before the same court in which the accusatory pleading is
filed.2 An exception, under previous law, was specifically provided for
defendants in custody within Los Angeles and San Diego counties3
who were to be charged with a misdemeanor 4 and arraigned in munici-
pal court.5 These defendants were allowed to be arraigned before the
municipal court within the county closest to the place where they were
held in custody upon approval of both the presiding judge of the near-
est municipal court and the presiding judge of the filing court.6 In ad-
dition, the accused was allowed to make three completed telephone
calls prior to being taken away from the place of custody.7
Chapter 395 expands this exception by giving both felony and misde-
meanor" defendants in custody in any county in California the right to
be arraigned before the court closest to the criminal defendant's place
of custody if it is within the same county and if both the presiding
judge of the nearest court and the presiding judge of the filing court
approve of the change.9
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §988 (definition of arraignment); see also 63 Op. ATT'y GEN. 193-
95 (1980).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §976(a).
3. CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 735, §2 at 2572; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§28020-28024.
4. Municipal courts have jurisdiction in all criminal misdemeanor cases. CAL. PENAL CODE
§1462; see also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §35 (1963). Superior courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over felony cases but have no jurisdiction over cases charging only misde-
meanors in counties with either justice or municipal courts. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §10; CAL.
PENAL CODE §1462; see also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §31 (Supp. 1973).
5. CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 735, §2, at 2572.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See note 4, supra.
9. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §976(a) with CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 735, §2, at 2572.
Criminal Procedure; scheduling of parole hearings
Penal Code §§3041.5, 3042 (amended).
AB 2832 (La Follette); STATS. 1982, Ch 1435
Support: Board of Prison Terms; Department Of Finance
Under existing law, the Board of Prison Terms determines a pris-
oner's eligibility for parole.' When prisoners are denied a parole date,
their cases must be heard annually thereafter until parole is granted,
subject to statutory exceptions. 2 Chapter 1435 expands on the allowa-
ble exceptions to the annual meeting requirement for certain
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3040 (gives the Board of Prison Terms power to grant parole).
2. Id. §3041.5(b)(2).
Selected 1982 California Legislation
Criminal Procedure
3prisoners.
Existing law permits a subsequent parole hearing to be scheduled no
later than three years after the hearing when parole was denied for
prisoners convicted of more than one offense that involved the taking
of a life.' Chapter 1435 retains this provision, and additionally permits
the Board to schedule the subsequent parole hearing within two years
after the hearing when parole is denied for any prisoner if the Board
determines that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be
granted at a hearing during the following year.'
3. Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 1111, §4, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE
§3041.5).
4. See CAL. STATS. 1981, c. II11, §4, at-.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(2). Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1981, C. I I 11, §4, at
Criminal Procedure; dismissal of criminal cases
Penal Code §1382 (amended).
AB 3421 (Parr); STATS. 1982, Ch 433
Support: Attorney General
In order to ensure a speedy trial,' existing law provides that, unless
goed cause to the contrary is shown, the superior court must dismiss a
criminal action if the defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days.2
If a delay is due to a request by the defendant, or if the defendant
consents3 to the delay or fails to appear, an additional 10 day period for
bringing the defendant to trial is imposed before a dismissal can be
granted.4
When a defendant failed to appear for a trial date and later returned
or was recaptured, a possible interpretation of prior law gave the prose-
cutor only 10 days to bring the defendant to trial.5 To ease this time
constraint, 6 Chapter 433 expressly extends the period to prosecute by
providing that if a defendant fails to appear after having requested a
trial date beyond the 60 day period and a bench warrant has been is-
1. See Sanchez v. Municipal Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 806, 810, 159 Cal. Rptr. 91, 92 (1979);
U.S. CONST. amend. Vi, §1; CAL. CONST. art. I, §13.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §1382(2).
3. Id. (consent may be express or implied).
4. Id.
5. Telephone conversation with Richard Igelhart, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Ala-
meda County, (August 17, 1982) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal). See generally CAL.
STATS. 1973, c. 847, §1, at 1513 (amending CAL PENAL CODE §1382).
6. Telephone conversation, supra note 5.
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sued for that person's arrest for nonappearance, the defendant can still
be brought to trial within 60 days of the next appearance in superior
court.7 Chapter 433 also prohibits the superior court from granting a
defendant's motion to set an earlier trial date if the defendant had re-
quested an original date beyond the 60 day period, unless the court
finds good cause for granting the motion and all parties receive proper
notice.8
7. CAL. PENAL CODE §1382(2).
8. Id.
Criminal Procedure; prosecutorial discovery rights
Penal Code §1102.5 (new); §1051 (amended).
SB 1808 (Maddy); STATS. 1982, Ch 1249
Support: Attorney General; California District Attorneys' Associa-
tion; Department of Finance
Under prior law, a prosecutor had good cause for a continuance if a
witness other than the defendant testified as to an alibi defense, unless
the prosecutor was or should have been aware of this evidence.I Chap-
ter 1249 limits the availability of this continuance to instances when the
witness is a defense witness, other than the defendant, and provides that
a reasonable continuance will be available for any testimony, unless the
prosecutor was or should have been aware of the evidence.2
Chapter 1249 states that upon making a motion, the prosecution can
obtain from the defense all statements3 made by a defense witness,
other than the defendant,4 after the witness has completed testifying on
direct examination.5 In addition, Chapter 1249 provides that upon re-
quest of the defense the court is required to review the statement in
camera and limit discovery to those matters within the scope of the
direct testimony of the witness.6 Furthermore, Chapter 1249 requires
1. CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 551, §1, at 1534 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §1051).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §1051.
3. Id. §1102.5(a) (statements can be oral or however preserved). The statements include
factual summaries but do not include the impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or
theories of the defendant, the defendant's counsel or agent. See People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 59,
634 P.2d 534, 543, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 467 (1981) (work product is privileged in criminal trials).
4. This is an apparent attempt to satisfy constitutional requirements against self-incrimina-
tion. See Senator Ken Maddy, Press Release, August 26, 1982 (copy on file at the Pacxc Law
Journal).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §I102.5(a).
6. Id.
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the prosecution to make available to the defense all evidence7 obtained
or prepared as a consequence of obtaining discovery information
through this provision.'
COMMENT
The provision in Chapter 1249 that permits the prosecution to dis-
cover from the defendant or the defendant's attorney, statements of
witnesses other than the defendant after they testify, may be subject to
constitutional challenge since this provision may violate the defend-
ant's right against self-incrimination, which is guaranteed in the Cali-
fornia Constitution.9 Although the purpose of discovery is to ascertain
the truth,' ° the task of creating prosecutorial discovery rights that allow
for effective prosecution without violating the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination has been a struggle of the courts for at least
20 years."
The California Supreme Court in Prudhomme v. Superior Court "
held that any evidence that conceivably might lighten the prosecutor's
burden of proving its case in chief would not be discoverable. 13 Some
case law held that prior statements of a defense witness for purposes of
impeachment were discoverable from the defendant or the defendant's
attorney." Alternatively, another case held that even statements that
impeach a defense witness without otherwise inculpating the defendant
7. This includes the names, addresses and statements of witnesses. Id. §1102.5(b).
8. Id.
9. See CAL. CObWST. art. I, §15. Another constitutional right that is threatened is the right to
assistance of counsel. See 30 Cal. 3d at 55, 634 P.2d at 540, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 464. "A defense
counsel's ability to freely investigate and effectively present the defense could be seriously coin-
promised. A rule that would open the defense files if a witness or the defendant testified could
penalize the defendant whose attorney was most vigilant in gathering, documenting, recording
and studiously analyzing evidence to prepare the defense." Prosecutorial discovery also risks con-
flict with the attorney-client privilege. ld.
10. See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 58, 372 P.2d 919, 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880
(1962).
11. See generally id at 56, 372 P.2d at 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
12. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P. 2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
13. See id at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133; 30 Cal. 3d at 50, 634 P.2d at 537, 177
Cal. Rptr. at 461. Furthermore, the test forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a link
in a chain of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense. 2 Cal. 3d at 326, 466 P.2d at
677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133; 30 Cal. 3d at 50, 634 P.2d at 537, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
14. See 30 Cal. 3d at 52-53, 634 P.2d at 538-39, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 463. Seegenerally People v.
Ayers, 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1975) (the justification for the holding was that the
privilege was personal to defendant and did not apply to third party statements); People v. Cha-
vez, 33 Cal. App. 3d 454, 109 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1973) (the holding was justified by the fact that the
witness had already testified when discovery was requested, and thereby opened the door to dis-
covery within the scope of the testimony); People v. Bais, 31 Cal. App. 3d 663, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519
(1973) (holding justified on fact that statements which merely impeach a defense witness do not
incriminate the defendant because they do not assist in proving the prosecution's case in chief).
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were protected and not discoverable.' 5
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Collie,'6 recently held
that prosecutorial discovery was not permissible absent explicit legisla-
tive authorization, and did not rule on the constitutional issue.' 7 Thus,
the constitutionality of prosecutorial discovery is still an open question.
15. See People v. Thornton, 88 Cal. App. 3d 795, 802, 152 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (1979); 30 Cal. 3d
at 53, 634 P.2d at 539, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
16. 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981).
17. Id. at 53-54, 634 P.2d at 539-40, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64.
Criminal Procedure; motion for suppression of evidence
Penal Code §1538.5 (amended).
SB 1744 (Holmdahl); STATS. 1982, Ch 625
(Effective August 27, 1982)
Support: California District Attorneys' Association
Under existing law, evidence gathered as a result of an unlawful'
search and seizure2 may be excluded by a motion to suppress evi-
dence. If the defendants intend to make a motion for the exclusion of
evidence or the return of seized property,4 they must comply with spe-
cific procedural provisions.' Existing law permits all search and seizure
motions in felony cases to be litigated in the municipal court at the
preliminary hearing and de novo at a special hearing in the superior
court.6 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 625, these provisions had
allowed the defense, at the preliminary hearing stage, to make search
and seizure motions to any evidence of the prosecution regardless of
whether the evidence had been introduced by the prosecution.7 In ef-
fect, any litigation of evidence not expressly introduced at the prelimi-
nary hearing stage lead to redundant litigation since the de novo
litigation in the superior court could occur regardless of the ruling at
I. CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5(a) (providing that the search or seizure is unlawful if (1) the
warrant is insufficient on its face, (2) the property or evidence obtained is not that described in the
warrant, (3) there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, (4) the method of execu-
tion of the warrant violated federal or state constitutional standards, (5) there was any other viola-
tion of federal or state constitutional standards, or (6) the search or seizure without a warrant was
unreasonable).
2. See generaly CAL. CONST., art. I, §13.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5(a).
4. Id. §1538.5(e).
5. See id. §1538.5.
6. Id. §1538.5(i).
7. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 137, §1, at 573 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5).
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the preliminary stage.8 Chapter 625, in an apparent attempt to avoid
duplications of court determinations, and make these provisions more
uniform and economical, 9 now requires that when the defendant opts
to make a suppression motion at the preliminary hearing, the motion
must be limited to only that evidence that the prosecution seeks to in-
troduce at this initial stage."l
Existing law also provides that if the property or evidence relates to a
felony initiated by complaint and the defense attorney's motion to sup-
press evidence is granted at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution
may file a new complaint or seek an appellate writ.1 ' Moreover, recent
amendments to the provision relating to appealable decisions by the
state 12 allow the prosecution to seek a motion in superior court to rein-
state the complaint if it is dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage by
a magistrate.'3 Some confusion, however, existed as to whether these
recent amendments applied to superior court decisions of the dismissal
of complaints due to successful search and seizure motions. "4 In K'ick
v. Superior Court,'5 a California Court of Appeals held that the Legis-
lature intended the enactment to include appellate review of search and
seizure determinations by a municipal court judge.'6 Chapter 625 codi-
fies this interpretation by expressly stating that the prosecution could,
in addition to other options, " seek a motion to reinstate the complaint
in the superior court after a successful suppression motion at the pre-
liminary hearing.'" Finally, Chapter 625 states that the intent of the
Legislature is that these provisions do not create any new grounds for
the exclusion of evidence 9 and are purposefully intended to be proce-
dural changes only.20
8. See id
9. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 625, §3, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5(0.
11. Id. §1538.56).
12. See id §1238.
13. Id. §1238(a)(9).
14. See Vlick v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996, 180 Cal. Rptr. 742, 746 (1982).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 998, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.50) (the people may file a new complaint or seek an indict-
ment after the preliminary hearing).
18. Id.
19. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 625, §2, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5).
20. Id.
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Criminal Procedure; testimony of victim
Penal Code §1346 (new).
AB 79 (Mountjoy); STATS. 1982, Ch 98
Support: California Peace Officers Association; California State Ju-
venile Officers Association; Parent Teacher Association
Opposition: California Judges Association; State Public Defender
Under existing law, when a witness in a criminal trial will be un-
available' at the time of the trial, the witness may be conditionally ex-
amined2 prior to trial provided the rights to confrontation and cross-
examination are preserved.' This prior testimony is admissible as evi-
dence in lieu of the appearance of the witness at the subsequent trial.4
Chapter 98 creates an additional circumstance when prior testimony
can be admitted at a criminal trial.5
The enactment of Chapter 98 protects selected victims from the emo-
tional trauma of testifying at the trial.6 When the victim is 15 years of
age or younger and the victim of certain sex crimes,7 the prosecution
may apply for an order to record the victim's testimony at a prelimi-
nary hearing' using either a written or videotaped transcript.9 To ob-
tain this order, the prosecution must make a written application three
days prior to the preliminary hearing. 10 If the application is timely, the
magistrate must order the victim's testimony to be taken at the hearing
and the transcript to be sent to the clerk of the court where the action is
pending."
I. CAL. EvID. CODE §240 (definition of unavailable witness); see id §1291 (use of former
testimony by an unavailable witness at trial).
2. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 1335-1346.
3. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1969); CAL. PENAL CODE §1340. See
generally Barker & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1030-36
(1974) (discussing the impact of the use of videotape in depositions on the right to confrontation).
4. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1291.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1346.
6. See Assemblyman Dick Mountjoy, Press Release, April 4, 1981 (copy on file at the Pacfifc
Law Journal).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE §1346(a) (specified crimes include rape; unlawful intercourse with a
female under 18 years of age; aiding and abetting rape; incest; sodomy; lewd or lascivious acts on
a child; oral copulation; penetration of genital or anal opening with a foreign object).
8. See People v. Ware, 78 Cal. App. 3d 822, 828, 144 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1978) (preliminary
hearing considered a conditional examination of a witness).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1346(a). See generally Barker & Bates, Videotape in Criminal
Procedure, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017-40 (1974).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1346(b).
11. See id §1346(c).
Selected 1982 California Legislation
Crininal Procedure
Furthermore, Chapter 98 requires the trial court to find that testify-
ing at the trial would cause the victim emotional trauma so that the
victim is medically unavailable,' 2 or that the victim is otherwise un-
available to testify due to physical illness or mental illness at the time
of the trial, 3 before a transcript of the testimony can be admitted as
evidence.' 4 Once a finding is made, the videotape or written transcript
may be admitted as evidence at the trial and the victim need not
appear. 15
12. See id §1346(d).
13. See CAL. EVID. CODE §240(a)(3). See generally People v. Herrera, 26 Cal. App. 3d 764,
179 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1981); People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1972) (provid-
ing guidelines for determining what constitutes unavailability of witnesses).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1346(d).
15. See id
Criminal Procedure; material witnesses
Penal Code §881 (amended).
AB 1421 (Leonard); STATS. 1982, Ch 56
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California Peace
Officers Association
Existing law provides that a subpoena' may be issued to compel the
attendance of a witness at a preliminary hearing.' Chapter 56 estab-
lishes procedures and penalties that apply when a witness fails to re-
spond to the subpoena?
Under Chapter 56, if a person who failed to respond to the subpoena
is determined at an evidentiary hearing to be a material witness, 4 the
court will issue a bench warrant5 for the person's arrest. After arrest
and upon appearance at the preliminary hearing, the witness may be
committed to custody until the conclusion of the preliminary hearing7
or ordered to enter into a written undertaking, 8 promising to appear
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §1326 (definition of subpoena).
2. See id
3. Id. §881(b), (c), (d), (e).
4. See generally People v. Rhone, 267 Cal. App. 2d 652, 73 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1968) (a sub-
poena may be quashed when the witness would not have contributed material evidence).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§979-986 (procedural requirements relating to bench warrants).
6. Id. §881(b).
7. Id. (the witness will also be released if the defendant pleads nolo contendre or is legally
discharged).
8. See generally id §1278 (undertaking format).
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and testify at the time and place designated by the court.9 Witnesses
who fail to obey the order will be imprisoned by the magistrate"° until
they comply or are legally discharged."'
Even though under existing law, the officer who makes an arrest pur-
suant to a bench warrant is directed to deliver the arrestee before the
court,12 and presumably the same procedure will be followed when a
material witness is arrested for failure to appear, 13 there may be situa-
tions when the witness cannot be delivered directly to the preliminary
hearing.' 4 In response to that situation, Chapter 56 states that the wit-
ness must be brought before the magistrate who issued the warrant, if
available, within two days after being taken into custody.'5 The magis-
trate will then decide whether the witness should be released on secur-
ity of appearance' 6 or maintained in custody.' 7 Chapter 56 guarantees
that whether the witness is brought directly before the court or is given
a hearing before a magistrate, a material witness will not be maintained
in custody without some form of judicial determination.'" Addition-
ally, Chapter 56 provides that a material witness may not remain in
custody for more than 10 days.' 9
In an apparent attempt to reconcile the competing interests of the
defendant, ° the material witness,2 ' and the prosecution, 2 Chapter 56
states that once the witness is remanded to custody, the prosecution is
entitled to have the preliminary hearing proceed, as to the witness only,
within 10 days of the defendant's arraignment.2 3 The defendant is enti-
9. Id. §881(b) (failure to fulfill the undertaking will result in a forfeiture of an amount the
court deems proper).
10. See id §807 (definition of magistrate). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIfINAL
PROCEDURE, Introduction §16 (1963) (discussion of magistrates and their functions).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §881(a).
12. See id §1199.
13. See id §881(b) (the disposition of the witness is to be determined upon the witness' ap-
pearance before the court).
14. See generally id §861 (preliminary examinations may be postponed, on a showing of
good cause, up to 10 days and under specified circumstances up to 60 days).
15. Id. §881(c).
16. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Proceedings Before Trial
§146 (1963) (discussion of security of appearance).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE §881(c).
18. See id §881(b), (c).
19. Id. §881(d).
20. See id §1050 (the defendant is entitled to an expeditious disposition of the criminal
proceedings).
21. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, §10 (a witness may not be unreasonably detained). See generaly
In re Jesus B., 75 Cal. App. 3d 444, 142 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1977) (suggesting constitutional restric-
tions on the length of time a witness may be detained).
22. The prosecution will want to present the material witness' testimony before the expiration
of the ten day limitation. See CAL. PENAL CODE §881(d).
23. Id. §881(e).
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tled to a reasonable continuance24 after the witness finishes testifying.2
24. See generally id § 1050 (procedural requirements for obtaining a continuance).
25. Id. §881(e).
Criminal Procedure; pretrial diversion program
Penal Code §§1001.50, 1001.51, 1001.52, 1001.53, 1001.54, 1001.55
(new).
AB 2072 (Levine); STATS. 1982, Ch 1251
Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; Chief Probation
Officers of California; Department of Motor Vehicles
In order to conserve scarce criminal justice resources and promote
the rehabilitation of defendants,' Chapter 1251 authorizes and estab-
lishes procedures for a pretrial diversion2 program at the county level
to become operative if adopted by the county board of supervisors3 and
approved and annually reviewed by the county's district attorney.4
Under this program, prosecution of criminal charges against a defend-
ant are postponed while the defendant enters an educational, treat-
ment, or rehabilitative program.5
Chapter 1251 provides that a defendant charged with a specified mis-
demeanor,6 can be eligible for this program.' Diversion, however, will
not be permitted if the defendant (1) has previously been convicted of a
felony,' (2) did not complete probation or parole,9 (3) has been con-
victed of a misdemeanor in the past five years,'0 or (4) has been
through a county pretrial diversion program in the past five years."
Furthermore, diversion is not allowed for an individual charged with
I. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 1251, §1, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§1001.50-1001.55). See
Note, Pretrial Diversion: Problems of Due Process and Weak Cases, 59 B.U.L. REv. 305, 306-03
(1979).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §1001.50(c) (pretrial diversion means the temporary or permanent
postponing of prosecution at any point in the judicial process from the time the defendant is
charged until adjudication).
3. Id. §1001.50(a).
4. Id. §1001.50(b).
5. See id §1001.52(a).
6. Id. §1001.51(c). A defendant is ineligible for the program if charged with (I) a misde-
meanor for which incarceration is required, registration as a sex offender is required, or probation
is not permitted; (2) a misdemeanor that is a violation of the Vehicle Code or one in which force
or violence is used (other than assault or battery); or (3) a misdemeanor which the magistrate
determines shall be prosecuted as a misdemeanor. Id.
7. Id. §1001.5 1(a). See generally An Analysis of State Pretrial Diversion Statutes, 15 CoLUaf.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 20-31 (1979) (comparison of states' criteria for admission to pretrial diver-
sion programs).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §1001.51(a)(3).
9. Id. §1001.51(a)(1).
10. Id. §1001.51(a)(3).
11. Id. §1001.51(a)(2).
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driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 12
If the defendant consents and waives the right to a speedy trial, 13 the
probation department must determine if the defendant qualifies for a
pretrial diversion program and the educational, treatment, or rehabili-
tative program that would be beneficial to the defendant. 4 If the de-
partment's recommendation for referral is to a community program,
the report to the court must indicate the willingness of the program to
accept the defendant and the manner in which the services of the pro-
gram will aid the defendant."' Chapter 1251 also provides that infor-
mation uncovered in the probation department's investigation or
brought to the department's attention subsequent to the granting of di-
version cannot be used in further proceedings.16 Additionally, this in-
formation cannot be used in pretrial sentencing procedures in the event
diversion is denied or revoked. 17
Upon receiving the department's recommendation, the court must
hold a hearing to determine if the defendant should be placed in the
diversion program.' 8 If diversion is ordered, the defendant's bail is ex-
onerated.' 9 The court, however, may also order the defendant to pay
all or part of the reasonable costs of the program if the defendant is
able to pay.2" In no event is the prescribed program to exceed two
years in length.2' Should the court determine that pretrial diversion is
not warranted, the proceedings will continue as in hany other case.22
Chapter 1251 also provides that the court will hold a hearing and
reinstate criminal proceedings if the court finds that the defendant
(1) fails to perform satisfactorily in the diversion program, (2) is not
benefiting from the education, treatment or rehabilitation, or (3) is sub-
sequently convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor using force or
violence. 23 If the defendant successfully completes the pretrial diver-
sion program, all criminal charges against the defendant will be dis-
12. Id. §1001.51(b).
13. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 322-332 (discussion of the misuse of diversion in
weak cases, particularly the pressures on innocent parties to accept diversion and thereby mini-
mize their risks, due to the expense and time involved in discovery procedures).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §1001.52(a).
15. Id.
16. Id. §1001.52(b).
17. Id.
18. Id. §1001.53.
19. Id.
20. Id. (the reasonable cost of diversion will not exceed the actual average cost of diversion
services).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. §1001.54. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 311-322 (by assuring the defendant of a
court hearing on the potential revocation, the defendant's due process rights are protected).
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missed24 and the record of the arrest will be expunged.25
24. CAL. PENAL CODE §1001.54.
25. Id. §1001.55.
Criminal Procedure; payment of restitution
Health & Safety Code §8101 (amended); Penal Code §§1202.5 (re-
pealed); 1203.04 (new); 243.5, 594, 1203.1 (amended); Welfare & In-
stitutions Code §729.6 (new).
SB 2060 (Boatwright); STATS. 1982, Ch 1413
Support: Attorney General; California Peace Officers Association;
Department of Finance; Los Angeles County District Attorney
The requirement of restitution' by criminals to their victims as a con-
dition of probation has been viewed as a rehabilitative tool since it
makes a criminal aware of the harm done to a particular individual.2
Under prior law, it was within the discretion of a court to order restitu-
tion as a condition of probation for most crimes3 except in cases in
which restitution was a mandatory condition of probation. Chapter
1413 now requires that restitution be made a condition of probation
upon the conviction of any crime,5 unless the court finds restitution is
inappropriate.' In the event restitution is deemed inappropriate, the
court has the alternative of requiring community service, unless it too,
is found to be inappropriate. The reasons for a determination of the
inappropriateness of either restitution or community service must be
1. "Restitution" is the payment to the injured party for the value of stolen or damaged
property (repair or replacement value), medical expenses and lost wages or profits when thes.e
losses were caused by the convicted defendant as a result of committing a crime. CAL. PENAL
CODE §1203.04(b)(3). Comparative negligence is not relevant in determining restitution, nor are
compensated damages actionable in a later civil suit. Id See generally REsTITrTrION IN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE (Hudson & Galaway eds. 1977) (papers presented at the 1975 First International
Symposium on Restitution).
2. See People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d 97, 100-101, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537,
540-41 (1976); Galaway, Toward the RationalDevelopment ofResilutlon, RESTITUTION IN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 77, 83 (1977).
3. CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 727, §1, at 772 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.1).
4. See generally CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 211, §1, at 587 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §8101); CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 566, §1, at 89 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §243.5); CAL.
STATS. 1979, c. 200, §1, at 445 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §594); CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1189, §1,
at 3840 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.5).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.04(a), 1203.1. Additionally, CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 1414, §1.5, at
-(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1) requires that restitution payments received by the pro-
bation department be forwarded to the crime victim within a specified time period.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.04(a). Restitution is appropriate whenever the crime in-
volves a victim. Id. §1203.04(b)(1).
7. Id. §1203.04(a).
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stated in the record. 8
Since restitution is now required as a condition of probation for
those convicted of any crime,9 Chapter 1413 repeals the specific provi-
sions that required restitution only for certain crimes. 10 Additionally,
Chapter 1413 permits the court to order both restitution and the per-
formance of community service as a condition to probation." Finally,
Chapter 1413 adds identical provisions for the imposition of restitution,
community service, or both restitution and community service as a con-
dition of probation for juveniles charged with crimes and who remain
in the custody of their parents.' 2
8. Id.
9. Id. §§1203.04(a), (b)(1), 1203.1.
10. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §8101 and CAL. PENAL CODE §§243.5, 594,
1202.5 with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 211, §1, at 587 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §8101),
CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 566, §1, at 89 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §243.5), CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 200,
§1, at 445 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §594), and CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1189, §1, at 3840 (enact-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.5).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.04(b)(2).
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §729.6.
Criminal Procedure; misdemeanor arrests, juveniles
Education Code §48922 (amended); Penal Code §853.6 (amended);
Welfare & Institutions Code §653.1 (new); §827 (amended).
AB 2357 (Cramer); STATS. 1982, Ch 1103 -
Support: Attorney General; California District Attorneys Associa-
tion; California Peace Officers Association; California Youth
Authority
Opposition: California Probation, Parole and Correctional Associa-
tion; Judicial Council
Chapter 1103 makes significant changes in the law pertaining to the
misdemeanor arrests of any individual.' Additionally, Chapter 1103
affects the rights of minors in the juvenile court2 system.
Misdemeanor Arrests
Under existing law, an individual arrested for allegedly committing a
misdemeanor, who does not demand to see a magistrate,4 may be re-
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6.
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §245 (definition of juvenile court).
3. See id §§653.1, 827; CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §807 (definition of magistrate). See generall, id §808 (persons desig-
nated as magistrates).
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leased on a notice to appear that can be filed with a magistrate or the
prosecuting attorney.5 If the notice for appearance is fied with a mag-
istrate, the appearance date must be at least ten days after the arrest. 6
Prior law provided that if the notice was filed with the prosecuting at-
torney,7 the appearance date must have been at least 30 days after the
arrest.' In addition, under prior law further prosecution of the misde-
meanor was barred if the prosecuting attorney failed to fie a notice or
complaint within 25 days of the arrest.9 Chapter 1103 increases the
authority of the arresting officer in setting an appearance date by delet-
ing the 30 day appearance requirement for notices filed with the prose-
cuting attorney.' ° Chapter 1103 also increases the prosecuting
attorney's power by removing the statute of limitations for filing a com-
plaint." If the prosecutor fails to file the notice or formal complaint
within 25 days of the arrest, however, further prosecution of the misde-
meanor will require either a new citation or an arrest warrant.12
Determination of Fitnessfor Juvenile Court
Existing law provides that upon receipt of an affidavit requesting the
commencement of proceedings in juvenile court to declare an individ-
ual a ward of the court, the probation officer is to undertake an investi-
gation to determine if juvenile court proceedings are warranted.' 3
Chapter 1103 requires the affidavit to be taken immediately to the pros-
ecuting attorney if the offense charged'4 renders the minor unfit to be
5. See id §852.6(a), (d).
6. See id §853.6(b).
7. Id. §691(5) (definition of prosecuting attorney).
8. See CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 28, §1, at 75 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(b)).
9. See CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 28, §1, at 75 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e)).
I0. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(b) with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 28, §1, at 75 (amending
CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(b)).
11. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e)(3) with CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 28, §1, at 75 (amend-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e)(3)).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e)(3).
13. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §653. See generally Marvin F. v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 281, 142 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1977) (the legislative intent behind this law was to divert minors
from the court process when the probation officer deemed it to be in the best interests of the minor
and society).
14. See CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE §707(b) (offenses that would remove the minor from
treatment under juvenile court law include the following: murder; arson of an inhabited building;
robbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon; rape with force, violence, or threat of
great bodily harm; sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm; lewd
or lascivious acts with children under 14 years old by use of force, violence, duress, menace or
threat of great bodily harm; oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great
bodily harm; penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign objects; kidnapping for ransom;
kidnapping for the purpose of robbery; kidnapping with bodily harm; assault with intent to mur-
der or attempted murder, assault with a firearm or destructive device; assault by any means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury; discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied
building; specified offenses against persons sixty years of age or older, blind persons, paraplegics
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treated under juvenile court law'5 and the minor was 16 years of age or
older at the time of the offense.' 6 If the prosecuting attorney decides
treatment as an adult is not warranted, the affidavit is to be returned to
the probation officer for any other appropriate action. 7 Under prior
law, it was possible for evidence to become stale while the probation
officer investigated the circumstances of a particular case. 8 This po-
tential problem is eliminated with the enactment of Chapter 1103 by
requiring the affidavit to be taken immediately to the prosecuting attor-
ney in the case of serious crimes"' and permitting the prosecuting attor-
ney to determine if proceedings should be commenced to determine if
the minor should be tried as an adult.20
Notfication of Juvenile Drug Abuse to Parents and District School
Superintendent
Prior law required the district attorney to provide written notice to
the minor's parents and to the district school superintendent within
forty-eight hours of the filing of a petition in juvenile court or a com-
plaint in any court accusing a pupil or minor of school age2' of posses-
sion, sale, or use of drugs.22 Since the superintendent of schools was
not among those authorized to obtain juvenile records without court
approval, 3 this notice requirement appeared to conflict with statutory
provisions protecting the privacy of minors.24 Chapter 1103 resolves
this conflict by expressly providing that, although the information
given is otherwise subject to these privacy provisions,25 notice may be
given to the minor's parents and the school superintendent without first
obtaining a court order in the case of alleged drug abuse by a minor.26
Additionally, Chapter 1103 eliminates the requirement of compulsory
notice.27
or quadraplegics; personal use of a firearm in commission of a felony or attempted felony; and the
manufacture, sale or use of specified weapons).
15. See id §§602, 653.1, 707(b).
16. Id. §653.1.
17. Id.
18. Telephone interview with Pete Sherwood, Office of Assemblyman Cramer, (June 23,
1982) (notes on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
19. See note 13 supra.
20. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §653.1.
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE §48200 (definition of minors of school age).
22. See CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 668, §9, at 2154 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922).
23. See CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1139, §1, at 2206 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §827).
24. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §827.
25. See id.
26. See id §82-7(b); CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922.
27. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922 with CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 668, §9, at 2154.
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COMMENT
Chapter 1103 reduces a minor's right to privacy in the case of alleged
juvenile drug abuse.28 This limitation appears to be in conflict with the
general philosophy of the California courts in interpreting statutes con-
cerned with the privacy rights of minors.29 Since juvenile court pro-
ceedings have not been considered criminal in nature,3 ° the courts have
been especially careful to protect a minor from the possible stigma and
ostracism that might result from the release of detention or arrest
records.31 The courts found that rehabilitation efforts were best served
by maintaining a confidential atmosphere in juvenile court activities32
and that the juvenile courts were in the best position to determine if the
release of record was in the minor's best interests. 3   Since the acquisi-
tion of court approval has not been seen as an onerous burden,34 it
appears that Chapter 1103 signifies a change in approach to the rights
of minors in the area of juvenile drug abuse by permitting the release of
information without approval and by not requiring the release to be
limited to sustained petitions. 5
28. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922 and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §827 with CAL.
STATS. 1978, c. 668, §9, at 2154 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922) and CAL. STATS. 1972, c.
1139, §1, at 2206 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §827).
29. See, e.g., TNG v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 767, 775-81, 484 P.2d 981, 935-90, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 813, 817-22 (1971); Wescott v. County of Yuba, 104 Cal. App. 3d 103, 108, 163 Cal. Rptr.
385, 389 (1980).
30. See In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 207, 183 P.2d 282, 283 (1947).
31. See 4 Cal. 3d at 775-76, 484 P.2d at 985-86, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18; 104 Cal. App. 3d at
108, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
32. See 4 Cal. 3d at 776, 484 P.2d at 987, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 819; see also 104 Cal. App. 3d at
108-9,63 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90. Records may be released to the parents of a minor. If other minors
appear in the same record, however, the parents must obtain a court approval for the release of
record information. See id
33. See 4 Cal. 3d at 781, 484 P.2d at 990, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
34. See 104 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
35. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §827(b).
Criminal Procedure; nolo contendere pleas
Evidence Code §1300 (amended); Penal Code §1016 (amended).
AB 3510 (Goggin); STATS. 1982, Ch 390
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California Peace
Officers Association
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; Judicial Council
Under existing law, a guilty plea or a final judgment I pronouncing a
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §577 (definition of final judgment).
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person guilty of a crime punishable as a felony2 is admissible as evi-
dence3 in a civil action4 to prove any fact essential to the judgment.5
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 390, the plea of nolo contendere in a
criminal action6 had the same effect as a plea of guilty, except that the
plea was inadmissible as evidence in a civil action arising out of the act
upon which the criminal prosecution was based.'
Chapter 390 declares that it is the intent of the Legislature to assist
the victims of crime in obtaining compensation for their injuries from
the criminals who inffict them by providing that a plea of nolo con-
tendere to a crime punishable as a felony has the same effect as a plea
of guilty for all purposes.' For offenses other than those punishable as
felonies, however, Chapter 390 continues to prohibit the use of the nolo
contendere plea and any admissions required by the court as evidence
in subsequent civil actions.9
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §17(a) (definition of a felony).
3. CAL. EVID. CODE §140 (definition of evidence).
4. Id. §120; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §30 (definition of civil action).
5. CAL. EVID. CODE §1300. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Judgment
§§182, 184 (2d ed. 1970); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE The HearsayRule §§604, 605 (2d ed.
1966).
6. CAL. EVID. CODE §130 (definition of criminal action).
7. See CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 299, §2, at 1345 (enacting CAL. EVID. CODE §1300); CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1088, §1, at 4930 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1016); see also Comment, Nolo Con-
tendere: Its Use and Effect, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 408 (1964).
8. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 390, §1, at -- ; CAL. PENAL CODE §1016; CAL. EVID. CODE §1300.
See generally CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 514, §1, at - (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §37) (provid-
ing trial calendar preference for civil actions for damages for personal injuries caused by a defend-
ant during the commission of a felony); CAL. GOV'T CODE §13959.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §1016.
Criminal Procedure; sentencing for kidnapping
Penal Code §209 (amended).
AB 1188 (Costa); STATS. 1982, Ch 4
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California Peace
Officers Association; Madera County District Attorney
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice
Under existing law, anyone convicted of kidnapping for ransom is
punished by life imprisonment.' In addition, existing law provides that
convicted kidnappers are ineligible for parole when the person kid-
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §209(a).
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napped suffers either death or bodily harm.2 With the enactment of
Chapter 4, a kidnapper who exposes a victim to a substantial likelihood
of death is also ineligible for parole.'
Chapter 4 was enacted in direct response4 to a recent California
Court of Appeals decision5 that granted a possibility of parole to three
convicted kidnappers who had been sentenced to permanent life im-
prisonment.6 Interpreting the phrase "bodily harm,"7 the court applied
the Jackson rule" which states that a sentence of permanent life impris-
onment is properly given only when the victim has suffered substantial
bodily or physical injury unnecessarily inflicted by the kidnapper or
proximately caused as a foreseeable consequence of the kidnapper's in-
tentional acts.9 Although several victims suffered considerable mental
anguish in this case, the court held that this was insufficient to justify
the harsher mandatory life imprisonment penalty.' 0 The new legisla-
tion will prevent the possibility of parole being granted in similar cases
when the victim has been intentionally confined and exposed to a sub-
stantial likelihood of death."
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Assemblyman Jim Costa, Newsletter, March 18, 1981 (copy on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
5. People v. Schoenfeld, 111 Cal. App. 3d 671, 168 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980).
6. Id. at 689, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
7. See id at 683-86, 168 Cal. Rptr. 769-71.
8. See People v. Jackson, 44 Cal. 2d 511, 517, 282 P. 2d 898, 901 (1955); People v. Isitt, 55
Cal. App. 3d 23, 29, 127 Cal. Rptr. 279, 282 (1976) (application of Jackson rule).
9. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 771. The isolated circumstance of physical
restraint or confinement of the victim has been viewed as being a necessary incident to a forcible
kidnapping rather than a separate act of bodily harm. Consequently, the mere confinement or
physical restraint of the victim has been held to be an insufficient basis for a denial of the possibil-
ity of parole. Id. at 686-87, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 771; see also People v. Soto, 74 Cal. App. 3d 267,
275-76, 141 Cal. Rptr. 343, 347-48 (1977) (injuries sustained when handcuffed are insufficient for
imprisonment without parole).
10. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 687-89, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 771-73. Three defendants in the case were
convicted of kidnapping a busload of school children and holding them prisoner for 16 hours in a
buried moving van on the outskirts of the California village of Chowchilla. Although the trial
court found that several victims had suffered the "bodily harm" necessary to invoke the perma-
nent life sentence provision, on appeal this holding was partially reversed with the court ruling
that the defendants were eligible for parole. Id. at 675-79, 689, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 763-66, 773.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §209(a).
Crihninal Procedure; notification of escape or release of inmates
Penal Code §§11155, 11157, 11158 (new).
AB 2845 (Rogers); STATS. 1982, Ch 1048
Support: Attorney General; Department of Corrections; Department
of Finance
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Under existing law, criminals nearing the end of their prison terms
may be placed in a reentry or work furlough program in order to give
them an opportunity to reintegrate into society and to ease the over-
crowding in prisons.' In an attempt to limit the number of crimes com-
mitted by inmates participating in these programs,2 Chapter 1048
requires the Department of Corrections (hereinafter referred to as the
Department), if so requested, to notify the police chief and county sher-
iff of the area where the inmate will be residing or working, of the
inmate's release in the area at least 30 days prior to the actual place-
ment date.3 The Department must also notify the inmate's crime vic-
tim4 or, in the event of a homicide, the victim's next of kin if the victim
or next of kin requests to be notified.5 However, a current address must
be provided by the requesting party.6
Chapter 1048 makes similar provisions in the event an inmate es-
capes from a state prison.7 In order to minimize the dangers to the
crime victim and the public,3 the Department must notify the chief of
police and county sheriff of the area where the inmate last resided, and,
if so requested, must also notify the crime victim, or victim's next of kin
in the event of a homicide.9 Finally, if the inmate is recaptured, the
Department must provide written notice of the recapture to all desig-
nated parties within 30 days.' 0
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §6260; see Press Release from Assemblyman Don Rogers, August 26,
1982 (copy on file at the Pacflc Law Journal).
2. See Press Release, note I supra.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §11155(a). SeegenerallyId §§11150-11152 (similar notification provi-
sion on the release of convicted arsonists from prison or state hospital).
4. Id. §11158 (definition of victim).
5. Id. §11155(a); see id §11157 (victims are informed of this right by a paragraph on their
subpoenas).
6. Id. §11155(c); see id §11155(a) (this information is confidential and not made available
to the inmate).
7. Id. §11155(b).
8. Telephone conversation with Beverly Jean Call, Assemblyman Don Rogers' office, Sep-
tember 7, 1982 (notes on fie at the Pacoc Law Journal).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §11155(b).
10. Id.
Criminal Procedure; expediting the appeals process in death
penalty cases
Penal Code §190.7 (new); §1239, 1240.1 (amended, repealed and
new); §987 (amended).
SB 294 (Nielsen); STATS. 1982, Ch 917
Support: Attorney General
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Opposition: Department of Finance
Under existing law, when the sentencing court' imposes the death
penalty on a defendant an automatic appeal to the California Supreme
Court is triggered.2 In addition, the Supreme Court must file an opin-
ion reaching the merits of the case within 150 days3 of certification of
the entire record.' Previously, the Legislature attempted to address the
problem of procedural delay for imposing death penalty sentences;5
however, it was apparent that the process of establishing the entire rec-
ord for appeals6 was still time consuming. Chapter 917 attempts to
accelerate the process of appeals in capital punishment cases by defin-
ing the entire record,' expanding the duties of the trial attorney9 and
abolishing the notice of appeal in capital cases.' 0
The appeals process has been unnecessarily slow due to delays in the
certification of the entire record" that is necessary before an appeal
commences. 12 In an effort to expedite the appeals process,' 3 Chapter
917 specifically defines the contents of the entire record. 4 Chapter 917
provides that the entire record must include, but is not limited to,'I the
normal and additional record' 6 pertaining to the appeal,' 7 a copy of
any record or paper on file with the superior court, and a transcript of
any oral proceedings reported to the superior court pertaining to the
trial. 8 In addition, the court may order the entire record to include
municipal court or settlement proceedings pertaining to the case.' 9
Moreover, Chapter 917 provides that the Judicial Council may adopt
consistent rules specifically pertaining to the content, preparation and
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §12 (the sentencing court determines and imposes punishment).
See generally id. §13 (limits of punishment stated); People v. Bob, 29 Cal. 2d 321, 175 P.2d 12
(1946).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §1239(b). See generally People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889 (1969).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.6.
4. CAL. R. CT. 33(c), 35.
5. See 9 PAC. L. J. REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 439, 445 (1978);
Senator Jim Nielsen, Press Release, Aug. 25, 1982 (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
6. See Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals: A Functional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23
STAN. L. REV. 676, 678 (1970).
7. See Press Release, supra note 5.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.7.
9. Id. §§1239(b), 1240.1(b). See generally id. §987(b).
10. Id. §1240.1(a)(2).
11. Senator Jim Nielsen, Press Release, June 1, 1982 (copy on file at the Paciflc Law Journal).
12. See CAL. R. CT. 33(c), 35(c).
13. See Press Release, supra note 5.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.7.
15. See id §1247k.
16. See id §1246; CAL. R. CT. 33.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.7(a).
18. Id. §190.7(b).
19. Id.
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certification of the entire record on appeal in cases in which the death
penalty is imposed.2"
Past practice apparently dictated that the appellant's counsel as-
sumes the burden of certifying the entire record.2' Since the trial attor-
ney is more familiar with the record,22 Chapter 917 requires
defendant's trial attorney to represent the defendant until the entire
record on automatic appeal is certified 23 and to check that the entire
record has been prepared without omissions or errors. 24 These duties25
imposed on the trial counsel, however, do not preclude the appellate
counsel from requesting additions or corrections to the entire record on
appeal.26
Prior law required that the defendant's attorney give notice of appeal
to the court in any criminal, juvenile or civil commitment case.27
Chapter 917 expedites the appeals process by limiting the duty of notice
of appeal to noncapital cases.2" Additionally, Chapter 917 requires the
court to inform the defendant's trial counsel of the additional duties29
including the duty of continuously representing the defendant until the
entire record has been certified. 30 The provisions pertaining to the con-
tinued representation by the defendant's attorney and the abolishment
of the notice requirement in Chapter 917 will be repealed on January 1,
1989. 3'
20. See id
21. See Senator Jim Nielsen, Press Release, Feb. 13, 1981 (copy on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
22. See id.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §1240.1(b)(1).
24. See id See generally id. §§987(b) (the court is to inform the defendant's counsel of addi-
tional duties in capital cases), 1239(b).
25. See id §1240.1(b)(1).
26. Id. §1240.1(b)(2).
27. See CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1385, §2, at 4589 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §1240.1(b)).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1240.1(a)(2).
29. See id §987(b).
30. See id §1240.1(b)(1).
31. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 917, §7, at-.
Criminal Procedure; sexual exploitation of children
Penal Code §§1524, 11107, 11165, 11166 (amended).
AB 3641 (Bane); STATS. 1982, Ch 438
Support: Los Angeles City Attorney; Los Angeles County Municipal
Court Judges Association
SB 658 (Ellis); STATS. 1982, Ch 1356
(Effective September 23, 1982)
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Support: Attorney General; California Peace Officers Association;
Peace Officers Research Association of California
SB 1848 (Watson); STATS. 1982, Ch 905
Support: California Peace Officers Association; Department of Fi-
nance; Northern California Juvenile Officers Association
Children involved in the production of pornography are being sexu-
ally abused.' Furthermore, commentaries have stated that the distribu-
tion of the obscene material contributes to other incidences of child
molestation by persons possessing the pornography.2 Recent legisla-
tion imposed misdemeanor penalties3 on persons who sexually exploit
a child by developing, duplicating, printing, or exchanging any film,
photograph, videotape, negative, or slide that depicts sexual conduct 4
by a person under 14 years of age.5 Chapter 438 facilitates the prosecu-
tion of this type of sexual exploitation6 by expressly providing that a
search warrant may be issued to seize evidence tending to show that the
crime has occurred or is occurring.7
In a related change, Chapter 905 promotes cooperation in enforcing
child pornography laws by requiring any commercial film and photo-
graphic print processor8 who observes or learns of any film, photo-
graph, negative, videotape, or slide that depicts a child under 14 years
of age engaging in sexual conduct9 to immediately telephone the proper
law enforcement agency and report the suspected child abuse.' 0 In ad-
dition, the processor must send a written report and a copy of the film,
photograph, negative, videotape, or slide to the agency within 36 hours
of receiving the information." Failure to make these reports could re-
1. See New York v. Ferber, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3350, 3355 (1982) (declaring that the exploitive
use of children in the production of pornography is a serious national problem and stating that the
distribution of materials depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children). See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 13-17 (1977). See generally Comment, Preying on
Playgrounds The Sexploitation of Children in Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 809, 810-17 (1978).
2. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 13-17 (1977). See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 810-17.
3. The penalty includes a fine up to $2,000, imprisonment in the county jail for up to one
year, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE §311.3(d).
4. Id. §311.3(b) (definition of sexual conduct for this section only).
5. Id. §311.3 (enacted by CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 1056, §1, at -). These penalties do not apply
to an employee of a commercial film developer who has no financial interest in the business. Id
§311.3(e). See generally 13 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1981 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 640
(1982).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §311.3.
7. Id. §1524(a)(5).
S. Id. §11165(1) (definition of commercial film and photographic print processor).
9. Id. §11166(c) (definition of sexual conduct for the purpose of this section only).
10. Id. §§1 1166(c), 11167 (contents of telephone report).
11. Id. §§I1166(c), 11168 (form of written report).
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sult in a maximum fine of $500, imprisonment in the county jail for up
to six months, or both. 2 Finally, Chapter 1356 encourages prompt ac-
tion to protect children" by mandating that the sheriff or police chief
make daily reports to the Department of Justice of any instances of
suspected sexual exploitation of a child.' 4 The report could eventually
be used to facilitate a possible statewide investigation.' 5
12. Id. §11172(b).
13. CAL. STATS. 1982, c. 1356, §3, at-.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §11107(b). Sexual exploitation for these purposes includes engaging a
minor in acts of prostitution, preparation of child pornography, or any other conduct that appears
to encourage child molestation. Id.
15. See Younger v. Berkeley City Council, 45 Cal. App. 3d 825, 831, 119 Cal. Rptr. 830, 833
(1975). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§11050, 11105, 11105.1.
Criminal Procedure; controlled substances
Health & Safety Code §§11366.5, 11366.7 (new); 11100, 11100.1,
11105, 11383 (amended).
AB 1916 (Davis); STATS. 1982, Ch 1279
Support: California Narcotics Officers Association; California Peace
Officers Association; Department of Corrections; Department of
Finance
The incidence of use of phencyclidine (hereinafter referred to as
PCP) is increasing although the dangerous side effects have become
well known to the public.' One reason for the popularity of PCP is that
it can easily be manufactured from a variety of substances.2 The ap-
parent purpose of Chapter 1279 is to discourage the manufacture of
PCP and other illicit drugs. 3 Chapter 1279 attempts to accomplish this
by broadening the list of substances that are illegal for a person to pos-
sess4 with the intent to manufacture PCP or an analog.' Chapter 1279
1. See Santo, Patterns of Drug Use and Characteristics of Adolescent PCP Users in Drug
Abuse Treatment, 9 CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS 369, 369-371, 381-385 (1980).
2. See Telephone conversation with Jim Rushford, Legislative Aide to Senator Davis (June
23, 1982) (notes on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
3. See id; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §4031; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11014 (defini-
tion of drug).
4. See People v. Camp, 104 Cal. App. 3d 244, 247-48, 163 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (1980) (the
elements of unlawful possession of a controlled substance are dominion and control over the con-
traband in a quantity usable for consumption or sale, knowledge of its presence and knowledge of
its restricted, dangerous drug character); People v. Hampton, 115 Cal. App. 3d 515, 523 171 Cal.
Rptr. 312, 316 (1981) (mere momentary contact does not necessarily constitute possession); People
v. Jenkins, 91 Cal. App. 3d 579, 583, 154 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311 (1979) (possession may be physical or
constructive); People v. Vasquez, I Cal. App. 3d 769,777-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1961) (each of
the essential elements of possession can be proved with circumstantial evidence).
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also expands the list of controlled substances6 that must be reported
when transferred7 and establishes penalties for reporting violationsY
In addition, Chapter 1279 prohibits the furnishing 9 of any chemical,
chemical equipment, or area for the unlawful manufacture, storage or
distribution of any controlled substance.'0
Possession
Existing law prohibits the possession of certain chemical precursors'
if the person in possession has the intent to manufacture amphetamines
or PCP.' In addition, the possession of a substance used to manufac-
ture these precursors or the possession of any compound containing
these precursors' 3 is deemed to be possession of the precursor them-
selves.' 4 Chapter 1279 expands the list of precursors that are illegal to
possess under these circumstances to include pyrolidine and
morpoline.'5 Chapter 1279 also prohibits the possession of precursors
of PCP if possessed with the intent to make certain analogs of that
drug.' 6
Reporting
Existing law requires any person who legally furnishes' 7 certain con-
trolled substances'" or their precursors, or receives them from an out of
state source, to submit a report of the transaction to the Department of
5. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1 1383(b) with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 749, §3, at
2247.
6. Id. §11007 (definition of a controlled substance).
7. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §1800(a)(1)(A)(9) (definition of transfer).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§lll00(a), lll00(b), 11100.1, 11105(b).
9. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §4048.5, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11016 (definition of
furnish).
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§11366.5, 11366.7.
11. Id. §11383(b) (the specified precursors are methylamine, phenyl-2-propanone, ethy-
lamine, piperdine, and cyclohexanone).
12. Id. §§11383(a), (b).
13. Id. (the precursors to PCP are piperdine and cyclohexanone).
14. Id. §11383(c).
15. Compare id §11383 with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 749, §3, at 2247.
16. Id. §11383(b). The analogs of PCP consist of 1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl) pyrolidine, 1-(1-(2-
theinyl) cyclohexyl) piperdine and 1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl) morpoline. Id. §11055(e).
17. Id. §11100(c). Those persons who legally furnish the specified controlled substances who
are not required to make a report of its transfer include: (1) any physician, dentist, podiatrist, or
veterinarian who administers these substances to his patients; (2) any pharmicist or other author-
ized person who furnishes these substances upon the prescription of a physician, podiatrist, den-
tist, or veterinarian; or (3) any manufacturer or wholesaler licensed by the Board of Pharmacy
who sells, transfers or otherwise furnishes any of these substances to a licensed pharmacist, physi-
cian, podiatrist, dentist, or veterinarian. Id.
18. .d. §11100(a). The specified controlled substances are as follows: phenyl-2-propanone,
methylamine, ethylamine, D-lysergic acid, ergotamine tertrate, diethyl malonate, malonic acid,
ethyl malonate, barbituric acid, piperdine, N-actylanthranilic acid, pyrolidine, phenylacetic acid,
anthranilic acid and morpoline. Id.
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Justice. 9 Chapter 1279 adds precursors of amphetamines, quaaludes,
and PCP2 to the list of substances that must be reported when trans-
ferred.2' Under Chapter 1279, first time offenders convicted of failure
to submit a report will be imprisoned in the county jail for a period up
to six months, fined an. amount up to $5,000, or both.22 Subsequent
offenders will be imprisoned in the state prison or county jail for a pe-
riod up to one year, fined an amount up to $100,000, or both.23 Under
prior law, the making of a false statement on this report was only pun-
ishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail for a period
up to one year.24 Chapter 1279 now provides that when a person
makes a false statement on this report for the first time, that person will
be punished by imprisonment in either the county jail for one year or
in the state prison, by the fine not exceeding $5,000, or both. Under
Chapter 1279, subsequent violators will be imprisoned in the state
prison for a period of two, three, or four years, fined an amount up to
$100,000, or both.26
Supplying to Manufacturers
Chapter 1279 prohibits retailers27 and wholesalers28 from know-
ingly2 9 selling30 any chemical, supply, or equipment that will be used to
manufacture or prepare3' a controlled substance intended for illegal
sale or distribution.32 Additionally, Chapter 1279 prohibits any person
from knowingly providing a place for the manufacture, storage, or
eventual sale or distribution of those substances.33 Violators of these
laws will be punished with imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year or imprisonment in the state prison.34 The punish-
ment for subsequent convictions for knowingly providing a place for
drug dealings will be imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
four years.35
19. Id. §§lIl00(a), 1l100.1(a).
20. Id. §11100(a) (pyrolidine, phenylacetic acid, anthranilic acid, morpoline).
21. Compare id §11100(a) with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 786, §1.5, at 2383.
22. Id. §§11100(f)(1), 11100.1(b)(1).
23. Id. §§lIl00(f)(2), 11100.1(b)(2).
24. CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 784, §2, at 2674 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11105).
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §II105(b)(1).
26. Id. §11105(b)(2).
27. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §6015 (definition of retailer).
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §4038.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE §7(5) (definition of knowingly).
30. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§12009, 13401(a), 17022, 19003 (definition of sell).
31. CAL. EDUC. CODE §32380(b) (definition of prepare).
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11366.7.
33. Id §11366.5.
34. Id. §§11366.5, 11366.7.
35. Id. §11366.5.
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Criminal Procedure; controlled substances-probation, sentence
suspension, juvenile law
Health & Safety Code §11055 (amended); Penal Code §1203.04
(new) §§1203, 1203.07 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code
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In 1978 the California Legislature increased the penalties relating to
the illegal sale,' manufacture,2 distribution,' and possession4 of the
drug phencyclidine hydrochloride (hereinafter referred to as PCP) and
its compounds, ostensibly in response to the reported devastating ef-
fects of the drug.' Chapter 1282 places further restraints on persons
convicted of illegal activities relating to PCP, including new restrictions
on grants of probation.' Similarly, Chapter 1283 imposes new proba-
tion restrictions on persons convicted of illegal activities relating to the
sale of cocaine and methamphetamine. 7
Prohibition of Probation
Under current law, the courts have no jurisdiction to grant probation
or to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence for any person
convicted of selling, offering to sell, manufacturing, or possessing for
sale one-half ounce or more of PCP.8 Chapter 1282 provides that those
persons convicted of transporting or importing PCP for sale; offering to
transport or import PCP for sale; attempting to transport or import
PCP for sale; and administering or offering to administer PCP;9 must
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11378.5, 11379.5.
2. Id. §11383.
3. Id. §§11380.5, 11382.
4. Id. §11377.
5. 10 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1978 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 406 (1979).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203(e)(8), 1203.07(a)(4), (5), (6); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§707(b)(20).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.04.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.07(a)(4), (5).
9. Compare id §1203.07(a)(5), with CAL. STATS. 1980, C. 1223, §4, at 4146 (amending CAL.
PENAL CODE §1203.07).
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also be denied a grant of probation or suspension of sentence.' 0 Fur-
thermore, Chapter 1282 broadens the law pertaining to possession of
PCP by providing that anyone convicted of possessing for sale one-half
ounce or more of any salt, solution, compound, or mixture containing
PCP or one of its analogs must also be denied a grant of probation and
the suspension of sentence." In addition, any person who knowingly
furnishes or gives away PCP may not be granted probation except in
unusual cases when the interests of justice would best be served. 12
Under Chapter 1283, a person convicted of possessing for sale one
ounce or more of cocaine' 3 or methamphetamine14 may be granted
probation only in an unusual case when the interests of justice would
best be served. 5 If probation is granted, the court must specify on the
record the circumstances which justify the probation grant.' 6
Presumption of Fitness for Juveniles
Currently, a minor charged with a criminal offense is within the ju-
risdiction of the juvenile court.' 7 A presumption, however, arises
whenever a minor 16 years of age or older allegedly commits a speci-
fied offense;'" the minor is presumed not to be a fit and proper subject
to be dealt with under the juvenile court law unless the juvenile court
concludes, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that the minor
would be amenable to the care, treatment, and training programs avail-
able through the facilities of the juvenile court.' 9 Chapter 1282 ex-
10. Id. §§1203.07(a)(6), (7).
II. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.07(a)(4); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11055(e).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203(e)(8). See generally People v. Wilson, 34 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527,
110 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106 (1973).
13. Id. §1203.04(b)(1).
14. Id. §1203.04(b)(2).
15. Id. §1203.04(a).
16. Id.
17. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §602.
18. See id §707(b) (the specified offenses are murder, arson of an inhabited building; robbery
while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon; rape with force, violence or threat of great
bodily harm; sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; a lewd or
lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof of a child under the age of 14
years by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; oral copulation by
force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; penetration of the genital or anal
openings of another person by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device when the act is
accomplished against the victim's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; kidnapping for ransom;
kidnapping for purpos5 of robbery; kidnapping with bodily harm; assault with intent to murder or
attempted murder, assault with a firearm or destructive device; assault by any means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury, discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied build-
ing; murder, violent assault, robbery, kidnapping, first-degree burglary, or rape accompanied by
great bodily injury against a person who is 60 years of age or older or is blind, a paraplegic, or a
quadriplegic and such disability is known or reasonably should be known to the person commit-
ting the crime).19. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§707(b), (c). See also People v. Superior Court of San
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pands the range of these specified offenses by adding a provision which
stipulates that a minor sixteen years of age or older charged with man-
ufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of any salt,
solution, compound, or mixture containing PCP is presumed to be unfit
to be treated under juvenile court law.20
In summary, Chapters 1282 and 1283 require imprisonment of per-
sons convicted of almost any illegal activity involving PCP21 and deny
probation and sentence suspension to sellers of significant quantities of
cocaine and methamphetamine.2 2 Additionally, Chapter 1282 raises a
presumption of unfitness for trial in juvenile court 23 for minors charged
with manufacturing, selling, or compounding one-half ounce or more
of any substance containing PCP.24
Francisco, 119 Cal. App. 3d 162, 174-87, 173 Cal. Rptr. 788, 794-802 (1981). There is some doubt
about the importance of shifting the presumption of fitness for the juvenile court process. See
Edwards, The Casefor Abolishing Fitness Hearings in Juvenile Court, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
595, 605 (1977); Hicks, Prosecutors in the Juvenile Court Process, 5 PEPPFPEDINE L. REV. 741, 758-
59 (1978). But see People v. Superior Court of Yuba County, 122 Cal. App. 3d 263, 267-68, 175
Cal. Rptr. 733, 735-36 (1981).
20. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §707(b)(20). Chapter 1282 also expands the list of specified
offenses that deny a juvenile the presumption of fitness for juvenile court to include: (1) minors
who commit a felony witness intimidation, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §707(b)(19), CAL. PENAL
CODE §§136.1, 137; (2) minors who personally use a firearm in the commission of a felony, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §707(b)(17), CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.5; and (3) minors who are illegally
involved with specified types of deadly weapons, including cane guns, wallet guns, and sawed-off
shotguns, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §707(b)(18), CAL. PENAL CODE §12020(a).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203, 1203.07.
22. Id §1203.04.
23. See People v. Superior Court (Steven S.), 119 Cal. App. 3d 162, 177-78, 173 Cal. Rptr.
788, 796-97 (1981).
24. CAL. WELF. & INSt. CODE §§707(b), (c).
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